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Most Iraqis welcomed us as liberators. And we glowed with pleasure at that welcome.
But now the reality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are
beginning to see us more as occupiers than liberators.'
I. INTRODUCTION
On Thursday, July 1, 2004, the Iraqi public and audiences around the
world were transfixed by the image on their television screens: Saddam
Hussein, the former dictator of Iraq, sitting in the dock in a courtroom,
listening to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for which he is
to be prosecuted. Yet the first images of the court proceedings against Saddam
Hussein were also a reminder that symbolism is in the eye of the beholder.
What to some might appear as a triumph for the enforcement of international
standards of justice and the transition to the rule of law in Iraq, may to others
seem a show trial adding insult to the injury of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
Asked to identify himself by the investigative judge presiding over the
proceedings, Mr. Hussein declared, "I am Saddam Hussein, President of the
t Ash I). Bali is an attorney in private practice in New York and a doctoral candidate in the
Department of Politics at Princeton University. She holds a B.A. from Williams College (1993), an
M.Phil. from Cambridge University (1995), an MPA from Princeton University (1999), and a J.D. from
Yale University (1999).
1. Iraq: Next Steps-What Will an Iraq 5-Year Plan Look Like?: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (testimony of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
presidential envoy to Iraq and Chief Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority).
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Republic of Iraq." When the judge corrected him and stated that he was the
former president of Iraq, Mr. Hussein curtly dismissed the correction, insisting
that no valid or legitimate authority had divested him of a title bestowed on
him by "the will of the [Iraqi] people."2 Through the rest of his twenty-six-
minute appearance in the courtroom, Mr. Hussein questioned the authority of
the Iraqi tribunal and delivered a political diatribe against the occupation. U.S.
and Iraqi officials were sufficiently concerned about the resonance of this
message that they took measures to shield the identity of the investigative
judge, "fearful of his assassination."3 Two principal reactions to the courtroom
scene could be discerned from person-on-the-street interviews conducted with
Iraqis immediately after the images from the courtroom were televised: first,
fear of Saddam Hussein's return after a performance suggesting that he was
neither as weak nor as humbled as previous reports by the George W. Bush
administration had suggested; and second, approval of Mr. Hussein's defiance
of the occupation authority's legitimacy.4 Both of these reactions suggest
something disturbing about the record of the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), and its successor, the Interim Iraqi
Government: more than a year after the prior regime was deposed, the Iraqi
public had little confidence in the new administration's ability to establish a
legitimate new government in Iraq or to prevent the return of authoritarianism.
The first example of Iraq's new justice system at work reflects the
deeply problematic relationship between occupation, accountability, and
justice. The hearings were held in a makeshift court constructed by U.S.
occupation authorities, on a U.S. military base, on Iraqi soil, at an undisclosed
location, with the identity of the judges kept secret, no defense counsel
permitted to appear in the courtroom, and the defendants held incommunicado
for months prior to their appearance in court.5 The courtroom was filled with
U.S. military personnel dressed in civilian clothes, the journalists in the
audience were carefully vetted by U.S. authorities, 6 and the images and
sounds from the courtroom were subject to U.S. censors. 7 The retributive
appeal of such a tribunal is clear. The then-executive director of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, Salem Chalabi, announced shortly after the initial hearings
that the death penalty would be restored (after it had initially been suspended
under the occupation) and that "capital punishment would be available to the
judges in the special tribunal's trials, even if it were formally restored after the
current hearings began."8 While many Iraqis may have been satisfied to see
their former dictator deprived of the rights that so many of them were denied
2. John Bums, Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi Court for Trying Him, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2004, at Al.
3. Id.
4. In July 2004, when the courtroom scenes were televised, I joined the worldwide television
audience from my family home in Istanbul, Turkey. The immediate reactions of Iraqis were captured for
the Turkish audience by interviews in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul that were broadcast on the two
principal all-news television networks in Turkey: CNN Turk and NTV.
5. Bums, supra note 2, at Al.
6. Claire Cozens, Media Blocked from Saddam Hearing, GUARDIAN (U.K.), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1251618,00.html (July 1, 2004).
7. Robert Fisk, US Military Tried To Censor Coverage of Saddam Hearing, THE
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), July 3, 2004, at 30.
8. Bums, supra note 2, at A6.
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under the Baath regime, the absence of certain procedural protections and the
imposition of the death penalty may undermine transitional justice in Iraq.
Show trials, if that is what the tribunal ultimately delivers, may symbolize a
transition from one regime to the next, but not a transition to the rule of law.
Indeed, the ongoing repression and violation of rights in Iraq in the initial
post-conflict period have already seriously diminished Iraqi and international
public confidence in the prospects for the rule of law in Iraq.
To approach the inquiry about the relationship between rule of law and
justice on the one hand and regime change, occupation, and reconstruction on
the other, the argument in this paper will progress through several topics.
Section II reviews the course of the invasion and occupation of Iraq and
considers the legal basis for the current, largely U.S. experiment in nation-
building. This overview will also consider the prior question of whether
nation-building is a feasible endeavor for an external occupier, or whether it
might be more appropriate to focus efforts on a less ambitious, more limited
project. Section III considers the significance of establishing the rule of law as
part of any project to rebuild Iraq. Section IV examines the relationship
between ordinary and extraordinary justice and asks how issues of transitional
justice interact with efforts to reestablish the Iraqi legal system. Section V
turns to the special challenges faced by a belligerent occupying authority
tackling issues of accountability and justice. Here, the paper will pay
particular attention to the specificities of the U.S. record in Iraq and to
arguments that a new model of political trusteeship is most appropriate for
considering the rights and obligations of strong powers-such as the United
States-when reconstructing weaker nations subdued by military force. These
arguments relate to a broader debate regarding justice and nation-building in
Iraq-namely the relationship between belligerent occupation and legitimacy,
to which the paper returns in conclusion.
II. INVASION, OCCUPATION, AND NATION-BUILDING:
THE U.S. PROJECT IN IRAQ
A. Nation-Building Versus State-Building and the International Law of
Belligerent Occupation
On March 20, 2003, the United States commenced a military attack
against Iraq that resulted, shortly thereafter, in a full-scale invasion of the
country. This war was widely considered illegal under both international law
and the rules of the prevailing international peace and security system
established (largely by the United States) in the post-World War II era.9 The
9. Immediately preceding the war, international lawyers issued numerous opinions stating
that the use of military force against Iraq would violate international law. For instance, the International
Commission of Jurists released a statement that the attack on Iraq constituted an illegal invasion that
amounted to a war of aggression. Press Release, International Commission of Jurists, ICJ Deplores
Moves Towards a War of Aggression on Iraq, at http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id article=2770-
&lang-en (Mar. 18, 2003). Similarly, an open letter published in the British Guardian newspaper,
signed by sixteen French and British academic specialists in international law (based at Oxford,
Cambridge, the London School of Economics, and the University of Paris), stated that "there is no
justification under international law for the use of military force against Iraq." War Would Be Illegal,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 7, 2003, at 29, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/-
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U.S. postwar strategy in Iraq was to govern directly as a belligerent occupant
rather than cede power to a formal U.N. civilian administration to govern the
country during the post-conflict transition. During complex negotiations in
May 2003, the United States prevailed in a political struggle in the U.N.
Security Council to obtain some measure of international legal authority,' 0
and with Security Council Resolution 1483 in place, the U.S.-led CPA became
the internationally recognized transitional occupation government of Iraq,
subject to the international law of occupation (as the resolution
underscored)-principally the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.1
Once the decisions to invade and then directly occupy and administer
Iraq had been carried out, the United States faced two significant questions
about its strategy for post-conflict Iraq: how to govern and how to exit. This
strategic choice, in turn, is directly related to the prospects of establishing the
rule of law in Iraq. A military administration relying principally on its
monopoly of force to administer post-conflict Iraq is unlikely to yield robust
local institutions capable of maintaining stability or commanding legitimacy.
In contrast, however, a hands-off occupation strategy might run the risk of
allowing a single strongman to take the reigns, an Islamist government to
form, or conditions of civil strife to yield to secessionism in the north or south
0,2763,909314,00.html. For additional articles detailing the consensus among international lawyers
concerning the illegality of the U.S. attack on Iraq, see Iraq War Illegal, Says Annan, BBC.com, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3661134.stm (Sept. 16, 2004) (citing comments by U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan during an interview with the BBC that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was
"not in conformity with the UN Charter" and was therefore illegal); Jeff Sallot, Legal Experts Say Attack
on Iraq Is Illegal, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Mar. 20, 2003, at 10 (noting that dozens of Canadian law
professors and experts in international law consider an attack on Iraq illegal); Emma Thomasson, Iraq
War Illegal but Trial Unlikely, Lawyers Say, REUTERS, at http://middleeastinfo.org/article2270.html
(Mar. 19, 2003) (noting that "many leading legal experts have rejected attempts by Washington and
London to justify a war with Iraq without a new [Security Council] resolution explicitly authorizing
force"). Indeed, a deputy legal adviser to the United Kingdom's Foreign Office resigned after ministers
ignored advice that the war in Iraq would be illegal. Marie Woolf, Legality of Iraq Occupation
"Flawed", THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), July 5, 2004, at 1 (quoting Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the lawyer who
resigned from the Foreign Office, stating that "'it could be alleged that the use of force in Iraq was
aggression' while 'the kinds of abusive treatment of Iraqi prisoners that have been alleged could amount
to war crimes"'). Further, in the aftermath of the war, numerous officials, including high-ranking U.N.
officials and even U.S. supporters of the invasion, have publicly stated that the war was illegal. See, e.g.,
Oliver Burkeman & Julian Borger, War Critics Astonished as US Hawk Admits Invasion Was Illegal,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 20, 2003, at 4 (reporting on a statement by Richard Perle, former Pentagon
adviser, that the invasion of Iraq was illegal); Anne Penketh & Andrew Grice, Blix: Iraq War Was
Illegal, THE INDEPENDENT (U.K.), Mar. 5, 2004, at 1 (reporting that former U.N. chief weapons
inspector Hans Blix stated that the war in Iraq was illegal).
10. For an account of the Security Council deliberations culminating in a resolution
recognizing the role of the United States and the United Kingdom in Iraq, see Felicity Barringer,
Security Council Almost Unanimously Approves Broad Mandate for Allies in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2003, at A12; David Usborne, UN Lifts Sanctions and Backs Role of Allies in Iraq, THE INDEPENDENT
(U.K.), May 25, 2003, at 6.
11. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4761st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1483 (2003). The
international law of occupation places considerable constraints on the authority a belligerent occupant
may permissibly exercise in a post-conflict setting, particularly with respect to the political institutions
and legal system of the state under occupation. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 54, 64, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter
Hague Regulations]. There is good reason for these limitations, related to the conflicting interests of the
occupier and occupied. See infra Section H.B.
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of Iraq. In some respects, the CPA struck a middle ground through the use of
local proxies (the IGC and then the Interim Government) to attenuate its direct
administration of Iraq by force. Unfortunately, this middle-of-the-road
strategy may have been designed more to compensate for the absence of
sufficient troop levels in Iraq than to empower local political institutions:
neither the IGC nor the Interim Government has yielded a viable model of
local governance capable of establishing the rule of law. Indeed, questions
about the legitimacy and authority of the U.S. occupying forces and their Iraqi
proxies helped fuel, in part, the current insurgency and caused many of
America's international allies to question the legitimacy of U.S. conduct in
postwar Iraq. 12 In part to compensate for this legitimacy deficit-both local
and international-the United States returned to the United Nations to fashion
a preliminary exit strategy, the partial transition of "sovereignty" to Iraqi
proxies accomplished in June 2004. A deal was struck with the principal
players in Iraq, and a transfer was engineered to an interim Iraqi cabinet
composed of individuals selected primarily by the CPA rather than the United
Nations. 13
Having undone Iraq's principal state institutions through radical de-
Baathification and the dissolution of the army, and having allowed chronic
public insecurity to govern the streets of Iraq, the thirteen months of direct
U.S. occupation through the CPA depleted Iraqi confidence in U.S.
governance strategies, wasted the potential political capital of legitimacy that
the United States (and the transitional Iraqi authorities) had initially enjoyed
after the fall of the Baath regime, and squandered a valuable opportunity to
lay institutional foundations for the rule of law in Iraq. In contemplating this
dismal record, one might ask how these errors could have been avoided. A
previous nation-building project in Iraq in the early twentieth century had
culminated in an equally poor record in terms of fostering stable, liberal
institutions. 14 To consider the sources of failure for external interveners in
Iraq, it helps to begin by examining the goals of nation-building more
generally.
Nation-building is an enormous subject on which a vast literature exists,
expanding daily. 15 When conducted by external interveners, nation-building
12. Christoph Wilcke provides a concise and helpful explanation of the U.S. legitimacy deficit
in Iraq:
The occupation's legitimacy deficit can be traced to two trends in national and local
governance. Instead of holding free elections, the US appointed national and local
councils to govern at its behest. Instead of nurturing the popular legitimacy of these
councils, the occupation authority opted for representational formulas based on the
sectarian and ethnic composition of the country.
Christopher Wilcke, Castles Built of Sand: US Governance and Exit Strategies in Iraq, in MIDDLE EAST
RESEARCH AND INFO. PROJECT, MIDDLE EAST REP. No. 232, Fall 2004, at http://www.merip.org/mer/-
mer232/wilcke.html.
13. For an account of the frustration of the U.N. Secretary-General's special adviser on Iraq,
Lakhdar Brahimi, at the CPA's failure to adopt his proposals, crafted in consultation with a broad range
of Iraqis, see Dexter Filkins, UN. Envoy Wants New Iraq Government To Court Foes of Occupation,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at Al.
14. See, e.g., TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING AND A
HISTORY DENIED (2003).
15. In addition to the dozens of policy institutes, think tanks, government agencies, and
international organizations commissioning studies of various aspects of nation-building, a number of
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involves the exercise of domestic authority by foreign actors with a view to
establishing a desired institutional framework prior to the return of
sovereignty to representatives of the indigenous population. 16 Salient features
of such an exercise include the preference of the external intervener for a
particular outcome of the nation-building exercise, and the abrogation of the
sovereignty of the indigenous population toward that end. In addition,
depending on the conditions pertaining in the relevant territory prior to the
intervention, nation-building may quite literally require the creation of a
national identity, if no such preexisting shared identity unites the territory.
External nation-builders must assume core state responsibilities, including the
provision of security and the exercise of political authority for the duration of
the intervention. At its most ambitious, external nation-building seeks to
replace existing local institutions with new ones, often designed by foreign
experts and imposed from above. The ambition and breadth of such projects,
frequently undertaken in the name of such laudable goals as democratization
and liberalization, lie at the root of their failure.
In the case of Iraq, external nation-builders have ostensibly shared a
specific political goal in occupying the territory: the creation of a liberal Iraqi
state. Toby Dodge provides an excellent history of the early twentieth-century
British nation-building experiment in Iraq.1 7 Dodge details the ambitious and
ultimately unsuccessful British efforts to build a liberal state in Iraq, focusing
on the disadvantages of an external occupier that faces financial and political
constraints on its investment in the territory and seeks to transplant foreign
political conceptions and institutions without a detailed understanding of Iraqi
society. Dodge's study displays a keen awareness of the danger that history
might repeat itself in the current U.S.-led occupation in Iraq. In a country such
as Iraq, with deep ethnic and sectarian fissures running through the "national"
identity of the society, large-scale nation-building of the kind envisioned by
the U.S. administration-and its British predecessors in Iraq-may well
require the forging not only of new institutions but also of a unifying national
identity. However, such a project would substantially exceed the authority of
occupying powers under international law. The tolerance that existed for the
radical social engineering projects of national-identity formation in the first
half of the twentieth century and during the state formation period following
decolonization is no longer as prevalent, since minority rights and diverse
ethnic identities exert competing demands. Further, the construction of a
common national commitment to citizenship in a unified state is not a project
recent monographs have added a significant scholarly contribution to the contemporary debates on the
subject, notably in studying particular nation-building efforts in context. See, e.g., AFTER EMPIRE:
MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES AND NATION-BUILDING-THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE RUSSIAN, OTTOMAN
AND HABSBURG EMPIRES (Karen Barkey et al. eds., 1997); JAMES DOBBINS ET AL., AMERICA'S ROLE IN
NATION-BUILDING: FROM GERMANY TO IRAQ (2003); NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND
THE ETHICS OF NATION-BUILDING (2004); NATION-BUILDING UNRAVELED?: AID, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN
AFGHANISTAN (Antonio Donini et al. eds., 2004); REVOLUTIONARY CURRENTS: NATION-BUILDING IN
THE TRANSATLANTIC WORLD (Michael A. Morrison et al. eds., 2004).
16. By contrast, many twentieth-century nation-building projects were indigenous exercises to
forge the institutional and political prerequisites to establish viable nation-states in post-colonial
territories. Such indigenously led nation-building exercises, while fraught with challenges, do not raise
the ethical and logistical obstacles with which much of this paper is concerned.
17. DODGE, supra note 14.
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that external powers can successfully undertake. This is a long-term,
incremental, indigenous, socio-political process that, if at all feasible, will
have to be undertaken autonomously by Iraqis. What, then, is the appropriate
scope for reconstruction efforts by the occupying powers overseeing regime
change in Iraq?
State-building is a term that is often used interchangeably with nation-
building, but it ought not to be. State-building aims at institutional support and
capacity enhancement-a set of technical prescriptions and logistical
assistance programs designed to strengthen the legal and political systems of a
given country. Rather than replacing or redesigning local institutions from
above, state-building is an effort to empower indigenous actors to improve
existing institutional capacity through the provision of technical, logistical,
and financial support. Even in the context of a post-conflict occupation, state-
building exercises retain most local institutions and indigenous civil servants,
with a reconstruction goal of rebuildin and strengthening state capacity rather
than recreating the state from scratch. This less ambitious project is a more
viable undertaking for an external power seeking to foster improved
conditions for the development of representative institutions in another
country. This project shares a great deal in common with the humanitarian
efforts that have become increasingly common in the last decade for the
reconstruction, on a consensual basis, of post-conflict societies.
In contrast to the bolder and more ambitious project of nation-building,
state-building is an administrative exercise that requires first that the
occupying powers meet the basic security requirements of the territory. Once
public order is established, state-building involves the reconstruction of public
(civilian) infrastructure and the design of transitional institutions necessary to
sustain governance. A good example of a successful state-building Vroject is
the much-studied Allied occupation of Germany after World War II. 9 After a
military defeat and a recent political history of totalitarian rule (but a prior
political history with democratic institutions), the German nation was in need
of a fresh institutional start, for which the Allied occupation provided the
basic infrastructure. Germany was, however, endowed with some measure of
the basic elements of nationhood: a common national identity, a common
political culture, and significant institutional endowments in terms of state
capacity. In addition, Germany had prior experience with democratic
institutions, providing a favorable context for the reconstruction of a stable
and liberal institutional framework. Finally, the U.S. occupation of Germany
18. It is worth noting that the most successful U.S. exercises in post-conflict occupation and
reconstruction are better characterized as state-building than as nation-building. For instance, the U.S.
occupation retained most of the state apparatus in both Germany and Japan after World War II, and most
of the civil servants in both countries were reinstated in the postwar bureaucracies. See FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 38-39 (2004).
19. Numerous scholars have returned to the German example to ask what lessons it holds for
current U.S. post-conflict occupation and reconstruction efforts. See, e.g., DOBBINS ET AL., supra note
15; NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE (2004); FUKUYAMA, supra note 18;
David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail, 29 INT'L
SECURITY 1, 49,61-65 (2004).
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took place against the backdrop of an external security environment that was
conducive to local acceptance of the state-building exercise.
20
The Iraqi context, in contrast, presents challenges of the nation-building
variety. 21 Unfortunately, an external intervention is particularly ill-suited to
the difficult process of politico-cultural development and social identity
formation that Iraqi nation-building might require. Having razed much of
Iraq's state infrastructure to the ground through bombing campaigns and de-
Baathification purges, the U.S. occupation authority may not be regarded by
most Iraqis as a benevolent power to which they are able to transfer the
loyalty and commitment that would be required to instill a new political
culture in Iraq. Prevailing in a military battle against a weak state with limited
defensive capacities is scarcely a qualification for the job of nation-building.22
One commentator argued in the immediate aftermath of the war that
[t]o make the occupation of Iraq a success, the Bush administration needs to reverse
course and get the United Nations involved in all aspects of state-building and nation-
building, beginning with the reestablishment of order and basic services. The credibility
and the legitimacy of U.S. leadership, together with a stable, independent, and free Iraq,
are at stake.
23
In light of the ongoing reluctance of the United States to involve the United
Nations, what are the current prospects for the nation-building project in Iraq?
The three criteria for assessing these prospects are the feasibility,
desirability, and morality of a nation-building project undertaken by
belligerent occupiers following the military defeat of an occupied territory.
The preceding discussion considered the serious feasibility problems raised by
the nation-building exercise in Iraq. While current conditions in Iraq may
require comprehensive nation-building, such a project is beyond the
capabilities of occupying powers. The better model for a more robust nation-
building project would be indigenous ownership of both institutional design
and implementation along with external logistical support. For new state
institutions to be stable and durable, they must be the product of local political
20. For a helpful discussion of the favorable local conditions in the case of postwar Germany,
see DOBBINS ET AL., supra note 15, at 153. Edelstein provides a good analysis of the role the external
threat posed by Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe played in fostering German acceptance of the U.S.
occupation authority. Edelstein, supra note 19, at 62-63.
21. These challenges derive partly from the absence of a common national identity or
institutional endowment favorable to democratization and liberalization in Iraq, but also in large
measure from the U.S. occupation authority's decision to dismantle Iraqi state capacity from the outset
by purging the civil service and disbanding the army.
22. It is useful to recall that designing and establishing new state institutions is a political
rather than a technical exercise. In order for such new institutions to command any allegiance among
Iraqis, they would have to be the product of political bargains struck among indigenous actors, rather
than an end-run around such political processes and the imposition of grand designs and best practices
by an external intervener. One advantage of an international or multilateral civilian administration over a
unilateral foreign occupation is the enhanced likelihood, in the case of the former, of the promotion of
local ownership of institutional reforms through the early and broad involvement of indigenous elites in
the transitional governance processes. The experiences with transitional administration of territories in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, and East Timor present a record of incorporating local authorities in the
design and planning phases, as well as the implementation, of transitional administration of post-conflict
territories.
23. Ronald Bruce St. John, Nation-Building Versus State-Building in Iraq, GLOBAL BEAT
SYNDICATE, Aug. 4,2003, at http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/stjohn-2-080403.html.
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bargains commanding sufficient consensus to bolster their perceived
legitimacy. The creation of institutions under occupation undermines the
likelihood of such a consensus being created and detracts from the legitimacy
of the enterprise. In the absence of a willingness to cede authority over the
Iraqi transition to a fully resourced U.N. civilian administration capable of
supporting indigenous bargains, this feasibility constraint calls for more
modest objectives. The best available alternative is likely the creation of
transitional institutions to permit Iraqis to choose the ultimate form of the
legal and political institutions of their state, and then the provision of
logistical and financial support to those institutions as Iraqis rebuild their own
nation.
With respect to the desirability of nation-building under occupation, a
conception of nation-building that requires an occupying power, without a
democratic mandate or the consent of the population under occupation, to alter
the fundamental legal, political, and economic system of the occupied territory
conflicts directly with the constraints built into the international law of
belligerent occupation.24 Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations requires
that an occupying power "re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.",2 5 The prohibition on wholesale revision of the legal
infrastructure of the state is clear.26 Any reconstruction effort by occupying
powers is limited under international law to providing transitional
arrangements to further the self-determination interests of the occupied
population. In this instance, the international legal constraints on the U.S.-led
occupation of Iraq should limit the CPA (and now the U.S. super-embassy in
Iraq)27 to making strictly necessary structural changes in Iraq for the sole
24. The international law of belligerent occupation was written in the twentieth century-and
rewritten in the wake of World War fl-precisely for the protection of the interests and rights of
militarily weak states potentially subject to occupation. There is no mystery, then, in the fact that
stronger states may chafe at the limitations written to protect the peoples that they subjugate by force,
and one need not search for profound changes in the international system to explain why powerful
states-that do not themselves fear occupation--consider these rules "quaint." See Excerpts from
Gonzales's Legal Writings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at A2 (citing a legal memorandum written by
then-White House counsel Alberto Gonzales, arguing that a change of paradigm in the nature of war
"renders ... quaint some of [the Geneva Convention's] provisions"). For the foundational texts of the
international law of belligerent occupation, see supra note 11.
25. Hague Regulations, supra note 11, art. 43. Expansive readings of this provision have been
advanced to suggest that it may permit some revisions to the underlying legal system in the interest of
ensuring "public order and safety." See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
OccuPATIoN 11 (1993).
26. On the basis of a conventional reading of the constraints imposed by these provisions,
British Attorney-General Lord Peter Goldsmith wrote a memorandum, leaked in the New Statesman,
advising the Blair government that the imposition of major structural reforms in Iraq was not authorized
under international law. The memorandum refers to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague
Regulations of 1907, supra note 11, and lists specific "limitations placed on the authority of an
Occupying Power," including attempts at "wide-ranging reforms of governmental and administrative
structures"; "any alteration in the status of public officials or judges," except in exceptional cases;
changes to the penal laws; and "the imposition of major structural economic reforms." John Kampfiher,
Blair Was Told It Would Be Illegal To Occupy Iraq, NEW STATESMAN (U.K.), May 26, 2003, at 16.
27. The CPA was officially replaced by the largest U.S. embassy in the world (with a staff of
over 3000) under the leadership of then-Ambassador John Negroponte on June 28, 2004. References to
the U.S. occupation authorities are generally intended to encompass the CPA and the super-embassy in
Baghdad that oversees more than 140,000 U.S. forces in Iraq, coordinates with Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi's Interim Government, and will coordinate with the new government of Prime Minister-
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:347
purpose of designing transitional institutions to enable the Iraqi people to
participate in choosing the form of their new government and the substance of
their new constitution. Whether, beyond these transitional structures, the
Iraqi people choose to entrench representative institutions should depend on
the outcome of their participation in the transition and not on designs imposed
by external intervention.29
Finally the discussion turns to the ethical considerations raised by
nation-building through occupation. Here it will be helpful to consider a
detailed example of the nature of the conflicts of interest between the
occupying powers and the occupied indigenous population.
B. Conflict of Interests: Building a Market Economy Through Occupation
in Iraq
The U.S. approach to rebuilding post-conflict Iraq has taken the form of
a democratization project bundled with a neoliberal economic agenda.
Changes to the Iraqi legal system have often been justified in terms of the
need to foster political liberalization in a post-authoritarian context. Whether
the U.S.-led occupation has facilitated or retarded democratization remains an
designate Ibrahim Jaafari under the transitional national assembly based on the Iraqi election of January
30, 2005.
28. Whether Iraq's January 30 election brought into being such a transitional institution has
been called into question as a result of the boycott of the elections by the Iraqi Sunni community. As late
as December 28, 2004, Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations suggested that the date of the election
be reconsidered in light of the ongoing violence and the likely non-participation of Sunni parties. Samir
S.M. Surnaidaie, Rethinking Iraq's Election, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at A19 (noting that "to hold
elections under current circumstances, when a sizeable part of the country is not secure, just for the sake
of voting, would produce a disproportionate and nonrepresentative national assembly"). In any event,
the 275-member Transitional National Assembly that resulted from the elections does not include
proportionate representation of the Sunni community, and as such it suffers a serious handicap that may
undermine the durability of the eventual constitution produced by the assembly. One hundred and forty
seats in the assembly are held by the United Iraqi Alliance, a Shiite coalition endorsed by Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The Kurdistan Alliance holds an additional seventy-five seats, and a group led by
Interim Prime Minister Allawi holds forty, with the remaining twenty seats divided among nine other
parties. Pragmatic indigenous leaders elected to the assembly may yet find a way to incorporate
proportionate Sunni representation, but if they do so, it will be the product of a local bargain rather than
the transitional institutions provided by the U.S. occupying authorities under the Transitional
Administrative Law (the interim constitution drafted, under the aegis of the CPA, by the IGC) under
which the elections were convened. For an account of the post-election tensions between the Sunni and
Shiite communities in Iraq, see Liz Sly, With Assembly Shaped, Iraq Constitution Next, CHI. TRiB., Feb.
18, 2005, at CI (noting that "[t]ensions between the Sunni and Shiite communities have been rising
amid fears that the exclusion of Sunnis from the process will deepen the insurgency"). See also Matthew
B. Stannard & Edward Epstein, Elections Begin Yearlong Political March in Iraq, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28,
2005, at A13; Al-Jaafari Says He Would Accept PM Job, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/-
WORLD/meast/02/17/iraq.main/index.html (Feb. 17, 2005); Shiite Alliance Wins Plurality in Iraq,
CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/13/iraq.main/index.html (Feb. 13, 2005).
29. On the eve of the elections, several U.S. analysts were already expressing concerns about
any constitution that would eventually issue from an elected Iraqi assembly, particularly with respect to
the rights accorded to women, the status of Islam under the constitution, and the procedural mechanisms
for ratification. Stannard & Epstein, supra note 28 (citing the respective concerns regarding a future
Iraqi constitution of Larry Diamond, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and Senior
Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority, January-April, 2004; Nathan Brown, Senior Associate,
Carnegie Endowment for Peace; Brett McGurk, Associate General Counsel to the Coalition Provisional
Authority, January-June, 2004 and Counsel in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad, June-October, 2004; and Anthony Cordesman, Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies).
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outstanding question, but changes ostensibly designed to promote
democratization are permissible on an expansive reading of the international
law governing occupation. By contrast, measures designed to facilitate the
economic liberalization of Iraq are totally indefensible in the absence of a
democratic mandate or the consent of the Iraqi people. The linking of
democratization to the establishment of a market economy takes the U.S.
reconstruction strategy in Iraq well beyond any internationally recognized
legal authority.
As indicated in the earlier discussion of the international law of
occupation, the transformation of an occupied country's fundamental laws is
illegal except insofar as it is necessary to bring the country's laws into
compliance with contemporary international human rights standards or to
meet the urgent security needs of the occupying authority. To the extent that
the occupying power is understood as a guardian or trustee, its obligation is to
maintain the laws in force and provide the underlying population with the
opportunity to elect a representative government that might then choose to
transform the legal system. The U.S.-led occupation authority has undertaken
a structural transformation of Iraq's economy through the promulgation of
orders overriding preexisting legal and regulatory frameworks governing the
Iraqi economy. 3The issuance of orders by the occupation authority designed
to create a model market economy-one exceptionally open to foreign
investment-is most evident in Order Number 39, issued by Paul Bremer as
chief administrator of the CPA in September 2003. 
The nature of the transformation entailed by Order Number 39 and other
economic regulations issued as orders by the CPA raises a sharp ethical
conflict inherent in the project of nation-building through occupation. 32 The
structural transformation of the Iraqi economy was effected through the
imposition of contracts on interim Iraqi authorities appointed by the United
States and the promulgation of regulatory changes directly by the CPA. In this
process of transformation, no mechanism adequately took account of the
interests of the Iraqi population. The lack of accountability to the population
potentially adversely affected by these changes and the absence of a
democratic mandate for the CPA's authority weaken ethical arguments
30. The parceling out of reconstruction contracts in Iraq on a preferential basis to U.S.
corporations is seen by some commentators as going hand-in-hand with this transformation of the Iraqi
economy to create an environment friendly to foreign (read U.S.) investors, treating both the rebuilding
of the country's physical infrastructure and the restructuring of its economy as a form of war prize. For
instance, Naomi Klein has advanced the argument that reconstruction in Iraq has become a form of war
booty. Naomi Klein, Bomb Before You Buy: The Economics of War, 2 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 331, 335
(2004).
31. The order states plainly that Iraq is to "transition from a... centrally planned economy to
a market economy." Coalition Provisional Authority, Order No. 39, Doc. No. CPA/ORD/19 September
2003/39, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220_CPAORD39Foreignnvestment_.pdf
(Sept. 19, 2003) [hereinafter CPA Order No. 39].
32. For purposes of this paper, a close consideration of Order No. 39 will make this point
clear. However, among the other orders deserving scrutiny are: Order No. 40, permitting the
privatization of the Iraqi banking sector (rescinded by Order No. 94); Order No. 49, dropping the
corporate tax rate to a flat rate of 15% (a nearly two-thirds reduction) (amended by Order No. 84); Order
No. 12, eliminating all tariffs on foreign goods (rescinded by Order No. 54); and Order No. 17, making
foreign contractors "immune from Iraqi legal process." See Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA
Official Documents, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Orders (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
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premised on treating the U.S. occupation authority as a trustee acting on
behalf of the Iraqi people.
A closer examination of the particular changes enacted by Order
Number 39 makes plain this conflict of interest. Order Number 39 enacted
five fundamental changes to transform the structure of the Iraqi economy:
1. Privatization of state-owned enterprises;
2. 100% foreign ownership of businesses permissible in all sectors
except oil and mineral extraction, banks, and insurance companies
(though the latter two are addressed under separate orders);
3. National treatment of foreign firms;
4. Unrestricted, tax-free remittance of all funds associated with the
investment, including, but not limited to, profits; and
5. Forty-year ownership licenses with an option to renew.33
The transformation of the underlying Iraqi economy and the legal
system supporting it entailed by this order is extensive. Iraq's centrally
planned economy placed all national enterprises under state ownership.
Accordingly, the first change detailed above amounts to a sale of the key
industrial assets of the state. These state-owned enterprises include many of
the key utilities (water, electricity, sewage) damaged by the U.S. bombing
campaign during the war. While these assets were being privatized, generous
reconstruction contracts were awarded by the Bush administration to such
firms as Bechtel and Halliburton. 34 Both privatization, which leaves thousands
of public sector employees jobless, and the award of reconstruction contracts
to non-Iraqi firms have seriously worsened an already catastrophic rate of
unemployment in Iraq. Yet the privatization provisions of this order are
perhaps the least objectionable of its features.
The aspects of Order No. 39 that represent a sharp departure from the
semi-protectionist practices of most sovereign states are the remaining four:
100% foreign ownership in key industries, national treatment of foreign firms,
unrestricted repatriation of profits, and forty-year ownership licenses. In
sectors of the economy involving national security, key industries, or strategic
assets, restrictions on foreign ownership are commonplace. Similarly, to treat
foreign firms on an equal footing with national firms is to prohibit any
protection of domestic industries in Iraq. Few countries in the world, if any,
completely prohibit preferential treatment for national investors and national
contractors over foreigners.35 The free repatriation of profits generated in Iraq,
33. CPA Order No. 39, supra note 31. Cf. Aaron Mate, Pillage Is Forbidden: Why the
Privatisation of Iraq Is Illegal, GUARDIAN (U.K.), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/-
story/0,3604,1079562,00.html (Nov. 7, 2003) (arguing that the inclusion of state-owned enterprises
within the definition of "business entities" under Section 1 of Order No. 39 authorizes privatization).
34. For an example of the generosity of contracts awarded to U.S. corporations for Iraqi
reconstruction, see Matt Kelley, Halliburton Gets over $JOB of Work in Iraq, boston.com, at
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2004/12/10/halliburtongets over-IOb-of work in-iraq (Dec.
10,2004).
35. Ironically, the United States itself appears to be engaging in preferential treatment toward
U.S. corporations in its bidding (or no-bid) process for the award of Iraqi reconstruction contracts. That
such preferences should be permitted for U.S. firms in Iraq but not for local firms suggests another
example of a conflict of interest between occupier and occupied. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Targeting
No-Bid Deals, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2003, at 2; Pentagon Probes Halliburton's Iraq
Contracts, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at A23.
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particularly at a time when the Iraqi economy is badly in need of the
investment of such revenues locally, shows little attention to the interests or
preferences of the Iraqi population. With U.S. corporations reaping staggering
profits in Iraq, the prohibition on Iraqi directives to reinvest some proportion
of these revenues in the troubled Iraqi economy represents a conflict between
the interests of the CPA and the interests of ordinary Iraqis. Finally, the effort
to lock future Iraqi governments into binding forty-year contracts negotiated
by a U.S. occupation authority bargaining largely with U.S. corporations
provides strong grounds to charge the Bush administration with war
profiteering.36
The impact of Order Number 39 on the Iraqi economy is stark and
designed to be durable. The marketization of Iraq's economy is problematic
both because the CPA violated the international law of belligerent occupation
by enacting legal and regulatory changes that alter Iraq's economy and
because these changes were made without the consent or participation of Iraqi
representatives. Further, the changes wrought by the CPA may have a
significant long-term impact on the Iraqi economy, even after the return of
sovereignty to a transitional Iraqi government. 37 In considering the
implications of Order Number 39 for subsequent Iraqi control of their own
economy, one author has noted that the order permits no more than semi-
sovereignty for a future Iraqi state. 38 Technically, a future sovereign Iraqi
government may repeal the orders issued by the CPA. However, with many of
these orders in place during the crucial first two years of post-conflict
reconstruction, the favorable terms for U.S. corporations have enabled them to
assume key roles with respect to infrastructure construction, operation, and
maintenance that will make them difficult and costly to replace once a
sovereign Iraqi government assumes authority. In addition, the powerful U.S.
interest in retaining the CPA regulatory framework for a marketized Iraq will
constrain the ability of a future Iraqi state to make changes to these laws while
maintaining access to international capital markets. For instance, one U.S. law
firm, commenting on the likely growth of foreign investment in Iraq, noted
that future Iraqi governments would be unlikely to repeal Order Number 39
for fear of losing much-needed foreign investment. 39 Further, the likely
dependence of Iraq for some time on the assistance of U.S.-dominated
international financial institutions and the costs in the international system for
reneging on contracts-even contracts imposed under occupation-are
sufficiently great that the restructuring of the Iraqi economy will likely be
more durable than the attempted transformation of Iraq's political institutions
36. For an example of an allegation of war profiteering, see Brian Whitaker, Spoils of War:
US Plans To Sell Off Iraqi Businesses Are Simply the Modern Equivalent of Pillage, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Oct. 17, 2003.
37. One analyst has noted that the CPA orders have given the United States a "lock on Iraq's
economy." Antonia Juhasz, The Hand-Over That Wasn't: Illegal Orders Give the US. a Lock on Iraq "s
Economy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at B15.
38. Melissa A. Murphy, A "World Occupation" of the Iraqi Economy? How Order 39 Will
Create a Semi-Sovereign State, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 445, 446 (2004); see also Daphne Eviatar, Free-
Market Iraq? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at B3.
39. Press Release, White & Case LLP, White & Case Lawyers See Foreign Investment in Iraq
Growing Through New Development Fund, at http://www.whitecase.com/news/-
news detail.aspx?newsid=10704&type=News+Releases (Oct. 3, 2003).
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towards democratization. 40 Adding economic structural adjustment to the
already profound destabilization of Iraq following the war has done nothing to
enhance the legitimacy of the occupation or improve the prospects for
stabilizing Iraq. The fact that U.S. economic interests are well served by the
transformation of the Iraqi economy while Iraqis experience further
dislocation highlights the divergence between the interests of the occupying
powers and the interests of the Iraqi population.
The portrait of the post-Baath Iraq emerging today is hardly one that is
friendly to the rule of law or to political liberalization. Indeed, it may well be
that while the U.S. invasion and occupation deposed the regime of Saddam
Hussein, the authoritarian regime-type over which Hussein presided has not
been disestablished. Given that U.S. military casualties have been at higher
levels since the so-called transfer of authority to the Iraqi interim government
and given the increasing strength of the Iraqi resistance, the vaunted transition
has failed to meet its principal objectives. 41 The question then is how to
advance the project of establishing the rule of law in Iraq given the many
mistakes in the nearly two years since the end of the conflict that have badly
prejudiced the outcome.
III. REBUILDING IRAQ: THE RULE OF LAW UNDER FIRE
The explosion of violence in Iraq has shifted international attention from
reconstruction to stabilization. If security is ever restored to the streets of Iraq,
the question of nation-building will reemerge as an important test of how the
U.S. invasion and occupation will be judged. The prospects for creating a
commitment to the rule of law in post-conflict Iraq may, determine the
outcome of this test. What would such a commitment entail?
4
40. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IIMF), in which the United States plays a
dominant role, may require Iraq to retain the changes made under Order No. 39 in order to benefit from
access to IMF loans. See Brian Dominick, U.S. Forgives Iraq Debt To Clear Way for IMF Reforms,
NEW STANDARD (Dec. 19, 2004), at http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show-
item&itemid=1340 (noting that it would be very difficult for Iraq to "step back from any of [the)
policies" adopted under Order No. 39 and still benefit from IMF assistance).
41. PHYLLIS BENNIS ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES & FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus, A FAILED
"TRANSITION": THE MOUNTING COSTS OF THE IRAQ WAR (2004), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/iraq/failedtransition. This report also provides a tally of the mounting costs of the U.S. presence
in Iraq since the transition, finding, in terms of costs to the United States, an increase in popularity and
support for al-Qaida as a direct consequence of the occupation, loss of U.S. credibility in the region and
internationally, roughly $211.1 billion expected to have been allocated to Iraq by congressional
appropriations by the end of 2004, and an increase in oil prices. The costs for Iraqis have of course been
far greater, with an estimated 100,000 civilian deaths, tens of thousands more injured, the unknown
long-term health and environmental consequences of the widespread use of depleted uranium in the
country, the rise in all forms of criminal activity and concomitant decrease in public security, a doubling
of unemployment to 60%, and losses to the economy from the devastation of Iraq's oil industry. In
addition to these costs, the report also takes account of the social costs faced by Iraqis in terms of the
destruction of their health and education infrastructure, the Widespread human rights abuses associated
with the occupation, and the sovereignty costs of military occupation. Finally, the international
community has suffered the deterioration of established norms of international law, the weakening of
international institutions (principally the United Nations), damage to the global environment, the
undermining of the global peace and security system, and the weakening of nonproliferation and
disarmament norms. Id.
42. There is a related question, taken up to some extent above and in more detail below, that
should remain in the background of any consideration of what is required to create a rule-of-law culture.
Is this task appropriate given the obligations and limitations of an occupation authority?
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Drafting excellent new Iraqi laws on paper will not suffice to change
Iraqi legal culture, as policymakers in other transitional contexts have learned
through bitter experience. Unless the Iraqi public has confidence in and
respect for the legal system, the rule of law will remain absent. Instilling such
confidence in a population that is accustomed to regarding law as a tool of
repression is challenging enough. With most Iraqis facing a daily struggle for
survival in an anarchic post-conflict context, it is nearly impossible. Extreme
public insecurity in Iraq not only pushes the rule-of-law agenda to the
backburner; it actively undermines the privileging of justice over order. Any
population subjected to the levels of chaotic violence prevalent in post-
conflict Iraq will be predictably desperate to see order restored to the streets.
This observation was Hobbes' great insight. If the nation-builders in Iraq are
not seeking to construct a Leviathan, they will face serious obstacles. To be
sure, there are scenarios under which one could imagine extreme political
violence giving way to the rule of law. The construction of a legal system
endowed with effective enforcement mechanisms and built on transparent and
legitimate institutions might be sufficient to commit Iraqis to a new social
contract based on the rule of law. Yet an important window of opportunity to
establish credible institutions capable of containing violence and establishing
both law and order was lost in the summer of 2003. Although other such
opportunities may remain, the privileging of order over law in an environment
of heightened insecurity is a dangerous context in which to build new
institutions.
These challenges are further exacerbated by the fact that any new
institutions are liable to be perceived as the products of occupation. To inspire
confidence in the rule of law, the legitimacy deficit suffered by institutions
perceived as external impositions will have to be overcome. Aside from the
question of the way in which such institutions are perceived, there is also the
substantive problem of how an occupying authority can involve itself in the
production of appropriate institutions absent a thorough knowledge of the
43
contextually specific, local conditions the institutions are designed to serve.
Indeed, most rule-of-law assistance and democratization programs sponsored
by Western governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) over
the last decade have suffered from precisely this deficiency. As a result, they
have relied on best practices compilations and a hodge-podge of local customs
and traditions to try to craft new institutions and frameworks that, once
formulated, recall Frankenstein's monster. Patched together from a number of
other contexts, but fundamentally informed by a conception of political and
legal institutions appropriate for a Western-style liberal democracy, these
projects have had little lasting impact or success in the local contexts in which
they have operated. While most analysts agree, especially based on prior
experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo, that "winning the peace" hinges on
43. As argued in Section II, supra, the design of new institutions is not a technical task to be
accomplished by experts imposing grand designs based on predetermined end-goals, but rather a
political task that can be accomplished in a durable and legitimate fashion only by local actors striking
complex bargains among competing indigenous interests and factions. Whether the task of building such
institutions can feasibly be accomplished by external actors is a recurring question.
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establishing the rule of law," creating a free and fair political system, and
inspiring public confidence in the police and the courts, there is little
consensus on how these tasks are to be accomplished.45 In the remainder of
this Section, I will try to bring some clarity to this discussion by defining the
rule of law, examining its purposes in a nation-building context, considering
local traditions of the rule of law on which the Iraqi project might draw, and
identifying, in concrete terms, the preconditions necessary to establish the
foundations for the rule of law in Iraq.
A. Defining the Rule of Law
Perhaps because of its centrality to the most important political
questions of the day, there are considerable differences between various
scholarly treatments of the concept of the rule of law. Rather than getting
enmeshed in those debates, I will offer a functional definition drawn from the
objectives associated with rule-of-law programs in post-conflict situations. In
those contexts, rule of law generally means: the provision of effective police,
courts, and prisons; consistent, fair, and publicized laws; recognition and
protection of basic rights; a reasonably representative and transparent set of
institutions for legislation and the promulgation of regulations; and
accountability for the abuses committed during and prior to the conflict. The
institutionalization and legitimization of these features of the rule of law
require effective public order through law enforcement as early as possible in
the transitional period.
This definition of the rule of law is quite minimalist. By contrast, a more
robust definition might add further elements such as the establishment of a
functional and democratic constitutional framework and legislation to support
a market economy. The problem with such a broader definition is that the
political form and the economic structure of a post-conflict regime should
reflect the preferences of the post-conflict society.4 But establishing the basic
44. See, e.g., Hansjdrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The
United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 47-48 (2001). With respect to
the U.N. missions in Kosovo and East Timor, Strohmeyer notes that
[t]he United Nations's most recent experiences in transitional administration demonstrate
that justice, and law enforcement more broadly, must be seen as effective from the first
days of an operation. The inability to react swiftly to crime and public unrest, particularly
in post conflict situations when criminal activity tends to increase, and the failure to
detain and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can quickly erode the
public's confidence in the United Nations.
Id. at 60.
45. The failure to establish conditions to secure the rule of law in the aftermath of the invasion
was not for a lack of awareness of the crucial importance of this strategy. See, e.g., Paddy Ashdown,
What Baghdad Can Learn from Bosnia, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 22, 2003, at 6.
The failure to establish, quickly and decisively, the rule of law in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
repeated in Kosovo, is something for which we have paid a high price .... Unless law
and order is consolidated quickly and comprehensively [in Iraq], peace will not take hold
and the benefits of the coalition victory will be swiftly lost as criminals and corruption
swarm into the vacuum.
Id.
46. An externally run nation-building project might attempt to foreclose this issue by
imposing an institutional design based on predetermined political goals. For the reasons previously
adduced, such a project is unlikely to succeed in establishing durable institutions. See supra Section
B.A.
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elements of the rule of law, particularly under conditions of occupation, will
likely have to precede the possibility of measuring such preferences, either
through elections or through other participatory, deliberative processes, in the
same way that state-building is necessary for nation-building. Securing public
order, functioning law enforcement mechanisms, and transitional political
institutions-all of which fall in the realm of state-building-will put in place
the conditions for free and fair elections to be held, constitutional assemblies
to be formed, and legislative, regulatory, and economic policy preferences to
be expressed in the context of nation-building. If all of these accomplishments
come after the establishment of the basic rule-of-law framework, then they
must be treated separately from the conditions for the rule of law, tout court.
To determine the form of the political and economic structures of the post-
conflict Iraqi state at the outset--democratic institutions with a free market
economy-is to foreclose Iraqi self-determination. Even if it were considered
desirable to constrain Iraqis to adopt particular institutions, it is not clear that
such a constraint would be feasible beyond the short term. The durability of
the political and economic structures that emerge from the occupation will
likely be proportionate to domestic perceptions of their legitimacy.
For the purposes of the reconstruction of Iraq, the U.S. occupation
authority's conception of the rule of law seems to be of the more robust
variety, including the meta-framework for establishing a liberal, free-market
democracy. Given the news from Iraq, this vision seems wildly unattainable
and idealistic, but that observation should not obscure the prior question of
whether this more robust definition is desirable. Just as this discussion
considered the desirability of a nation-building project in Iraq, so too should it
inquire into the desirability of an ambitious, substantive conception of the rule
of law.
Different actors in the international system advocate the rule of law for
different reasons.47 Many of the recommendations associated with the rule-of-
law toolkit that has emerged out of a decade of programs were developed in
the post-communist setting and are less applicable outside of that context. In
countries emerging from civil conflict or external military intervention,
foreign advisers and NGOs are often present on a less consensual basis, and
the circumstances of the underlying societies do not necessarily resemble
those found in former communist nations.
The reform priorities in post-conflict settings require careful, context-
specific planning. Where, as in Iraq, a territory is governed by a U.S. civilian
47. As Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks has noted, at least three forms of rule-of-law packages are
advanced by different international actors. International financial institutions have incorporated rule-of-
law and governance requirements into the conditionality provisions of their loans to ensure that the
underlying legal and regulatory frameworks support the protection of property rights and the
enforcement of contracts. Numerous NGOs advocate the rule of law as essential to the protection of
human rights and the provision of constitutional limitations on state power. Effective law enforcement
and international legal harmonization through rule-of-law promotion are even considered prongs of the
war on terror, insofar as coordinated international policing efforts require the right infrastructure in
domestic legal systems. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule
of Law", 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2276-77 (2003). Further, many rule-of-law and governance programs
were designed for post-Soviet transitions. Specifically, many of the programs in the 1990s focused on
developing the legal, regulatory, and institutional infrastructure to support a market economy and
democratization. Id.
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administrator (or an ambassador who works directly with interim Iraqi
officials), and U.S. forces are directly involved in detaining Iraqi suspects,
supervising courts, and controlling prisons (often run out of U.S. military
bases), there is a serious danger that rule-of-law programs will take on an
imperial complexion. This result is particularly damaging because where the
promotion of the rule of law is perceived as part and parcel of an imperialist
project, even the most carefully tailored program will fail. While the formal,
institutional objectives of a rule-of-law program may be secured with the aid
of new judicial and law enforcement personnel and by rebuilding courthouses,
the substantive commitment of the local population to those institutions, and
to the rule of law more generally, will likely be undermined. 4 8 But how, then,
can the underlying purpose of rule-of-law programs--engendering a legal and
political culture that supports and preserves institutions that enforce laws,
protect rights, and legislate and adjudicate in ways that are perceived to be fair
and legitimate-be accomplished under occupation?
Perhaps the best response requires developing a context-specific account
of the purpose of rule-of-law promotion in Iraq. In light of the current impasse
in Iraq, more modest, less ambitious priorities focusing on the essential
requirements for the transitional period are in order. Bold visions of
democratization and free markets should be deferred until Iraqis can express
their preferences for the political form and economic structure of their future,
sovereign state. In the interim, rule-of-law promotion should be restricted to
the basics of establishing transitional institutions capable of commanding the
respect of some plurality of the Iraqi population they are designed to serve-
in other words, restricted to the rule of law for the purpose of state-building.
Particularly in a context in which the public insecurity resulting from the U.S.
occupation has exacerbated the underlying ethnic and sectarian fissures in
Iraqi society, persuading significant sectors of the population to transfer their
loyalties from ethnic, sectarian, or tribal affiliations to national or federal
institutions, albeit transitional ones, is a sufficiently ambitious goal. Building
on the legal traditions of the region would be a good starting point.
B. Rule of Law in the Arab World
There are three sets of resources and one important insight to be drawn
from a consideration of the operation of the rule of law in the Arab world.
48. Brooks attributes the failure of many rule-of-law promotion programs to a failure to take
norms and culture adequately into account. Id. at 2285. She argues that changes in the formal law cannot
by themselves generate new normative commitments to the rule of law. Id. at 2301. The socio-cultural
prerequisites for that commitment are generated by norm entrepreneurs engaging in broad politico-
cultural agenda-shifting projects and seeking to initiate incremental change. Id. at 2326-28. Such
strategies are driven by indigenous players, for the most part, and involve a long-term commitment that
generally outstrips the political and financial investment that external actors are prepared to make to
engage with the local context. Id. at 2333-40. Brooks concludes by noting that
i]n a sense, citizens of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and the like must put up with some of
the worst aspects of imperialism (culturally insensitive occupying armies that drive up
prices, distort local economies, and push through ham-handed "reforms") with few of
imperialism's benefits, such as they were; the new imperialists lack the capacity or the
will to stamp out crime, pick up the trash, or make the trains run on time.
Id. at 2283.
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First, as this paper will suggest below, the rule of law in the Middle East, and
in Arab constitutional traditions in particular, prioritizes the organization of
political power over the limitation of political authority. Put more simply, the
rule of law is about enhancing state capacity. Second, some important rule-of-
law commitments and values are present in Arab legal traditions. Third, there
are resources in Iraq's political and legal traditions, including those built on
Baathist ideology, that might serve the purposes of institution-building
oriented toward the rule of law in Iraq today. Finally, an insight drawn from
the discussion of these first three points is that the rule of law may have to
serve different purposes and take a different form in the Iraqi transitional
context from the ideal type of the liberal, free-market, democratic model that
is most commonly promoted through rule-of-law assistance programs. In
particular, disaggregating commitments to a market economy or to Western-
style, liberal rights protection from the basic project of establishing the
minimum conditions for the rule of law may be an important determinant of
the initial success of the programs undertaken in Iraq.
In his research on the antecedents of Middle Eastern constitutions as a
synthesis from Ottoman, Egyptian, and colonial constitutional traditions of the
nineteenth century, Nathan Brown notes that these constitutions were
generally drafted in the broader political context of authoritarian rule and
designed to augment political authority rather than check it. While the
constitutional traditions of the region may be authoritarian, they are not
merely rhetorical exercises. These constitutions were designed to enhance
state authority, render the exercise of executive power more efficient, build
administrative capacity, reiterate the sovereignty of the state, and promote the
ideology of the ruling party.49 Many of these goals are also U.S. priorities in
Iraq-at least those that pertain to effective, efficient governance and
centralized authority. With twenty-twenty hindsight, commentators and U.S.
officials alike agree that the decisions to disband the Iraqi military, take apart
the state security apparatus (including its basic policing infrastructure), and
engage in widespread lustration of Baathist civil servants were disastrous.
50
Similarly, dismantling existing institutions of governance, however flawed,
without an alternative set of structures in place to take over basic state
functions, is obviously ill-advised.
Another interesting potential resource in post-colonial Arab legal
systems is the propensity to adopt and adapt elements from Western legal
traditions. Elites in Iraq and throughout the Arab world fashioned their own
legal systems, post-independence, based at least in part on those aspects of
Western legal models that were expected to render political power more
effective, centralized, and efficient. To some extent the norms of liberal
legality-conceiving of the rule of law as a means of checking executive
49. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD xiii-xiv, 10-13, 91-
94(2002).
50. For instance, Prime Minister Tony Blair and retired U.S. General Jay Garner, the first
Bush administration appointee placed in charge of the occupation in Iraq in March 2003, have both
publicly stated that the decision to disband the Iraqi army was a mistake. See, e.g., Blair: Totally
Disbanding the Iraqi Army Was a Mistake, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP., Sept. 26, 2004; Michael
McDonough, Garner: US Made Postwar Iraq Mistakes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 26, 2003.
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authority and subjecting political institutions to governance according to
law-were also adopted through a combination of isomorphism and emulation
in the Arab legal systems of the twentieth century. The concept of siyadat al-
qanun (the Arabic equivalent of the rule of law) is present in the legal
traditions of most Arab states, as are prohibitions on retroactive laws, the
protection of basic property rights, and the principle of judicial
independence.51 In all three of these domains, as with the rule of law more
generally, these principles are generally honored in the breach, but they are
present in written constitutions and laws and in the political and legal
consciousness of citizens of Arab states.
Finally, it is worth noting that Iraq's own constitutional tradition was
premised on Baathist ideology. While the United States has been able to
eliminate the Baath party and de-Baathify the Iraqi public sector, some of
Baathism's core values have likely survived these purges in the underlying
political culture of Iraq. The principles of Arab unity,52 nationalism, and social
and economic justice will likely remain among the basic cultural
commitments of Iraqi society. Building on these core values, rather than
seeking to efface them, is one way to take account of local culture in the
institution- and state-building process. 53 If the United States is committed, as
it appears to be, to maintaining Iraq as a multiethnic, secular state within its
present borders, it will have to find ways of identifying and building on
national institutions that can support a common Iraqi identity. If Iraqis cannot
successfully transfer at least some loyalty to national institutions, then
political liberalization and heterogeneity may prove to be incompatible with
preserving Iraq's territorial unity. Other than the underlying values of
Baathism, the only other common political experience that cuts across most
lines in Iraq is that of opposing occupation. On the one hand, this observation
highlights the difficulty of establishing the conditions for stable, national
institutions as an occupying power. The United States may ironically face a
situation in which the strongest basis for the emergence of a common Iraqi
identity will be united opposition to the U.S. presence in Iraq. On the other
hand, though such a united common identity may not support stable
51. NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE
GULF 8-10, 241 (1997). For a discussion of constitutional developments and isomorphism with certain
Western legal concepts in the broader Islamic world, see id. at 1-18.
52. This commitment to solidarity has no doubt been attenuated to some extent for many
Iraqis embittered by what they perceive as Arab complicity in the crimes of the Baath regime or the
failure of other Arab states to intervene on behalf of Iraq during the twelve-year-long sanctions regime.
Nonetheless, continued popular expressions of empathy for the plight of the Palestinians in Iraq, coupled
with a sense that the state has emerged from its long period of isolation and rejoined the broader region,
indicate that even the pan-Arab commitments of Baathism have not been fully undermined.
53. For instance, the privileging of principles of equity over efficiency in the socio-economic
commitments of Iraqis should be respected. Adopting a conception of the rule of law premised on
economic liberalization may not be compatible in the short term with Iraqi political culture. For an
excellent discussion of the origins and basic tenets of Baath ideology, see WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A
HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 325-26 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that Baath doctrine emphasizes "a
revolutionary mission to bring an end to social injustice, class exploitation and tyranny and to establish
freedom, democracy and socialism"). For additional sources on Baath doctrine, see Encyclopaedia of the
Orient, Ba 'th Socialist Party, at http://lexicorient.com/e.o/baath.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); Library
of Congress Country Studies, The Baath Party, at http://Icweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/-
cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0077) (May 1988).
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transitional institutions as long as U.S. forces remain in effective control of
Iraq, it may provide a basis for securing broad commitment to national
institutions under a successor regime. Once Iraq regains full sovereignty, a
post-conflict regime might be able to instill public commitment to its
institutions as a symbol of liberation from U.S. domination, particularly if it
succeeds in preserving some autonomy in its subsequent relations with the
United States. If the concern lies principally with building stable and
legitimate institutions and securing public commitment to them in rule-of-law
promotion efforts, then whether success in these regards is accomplished at
the expense of anti-Americanism should be of secondary importance.
54
This brief survey of the potential rule-of-law resources in Arab and Iraqi
legal traditions offers meager pickings for the liberal democratizer. Is there
something worth salvaging in the promotion of the rule of law once it has
been unbundled from other substantive commitments such as democratization,
marketization, or a liberal conception of individual rights? In line with the
more modest ambitions advanced in Section II, it is useful to return to the
question of how to define the rule of law and understand its relationship to
state-building. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the definition
appropriate to present conditions in Iraq may have to be limited to the
following: a commitment to the autonomy of legal institutions, the protection
of basic rights (that is, a potentially smaller category than might be thought
basic to a liberal account of rights), and tolerance for regulatory controls
incompatible with a fully liberal, market-based economy. From this definition,
the goal would be to design institutional arrangements that promote
accountability in governance and protect citizens' rights, rather than ideally
liberal institutions that have a lesser prospect of taking root. In other words,
the priority for building the rule of law in Iraq would be the more modest
(though still quite ambitious) goal of establishing stable and transparent laws
and ensuring the protection of the basic rights valued by the members of the
Iraqi polity to lay the foundations of an Iraqi state, rather than embarking on
ambitious projects to attain complete political and economic liberalization.
C. Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq
The discussion now turns to the practical question of what policies might
best promote the establishment of basic rule-of-law commitments in present-
day Iraq. A survey of authoritative policy literature on this subject yields a set
of six prerequisites for establishing the rule of law, most of which follow
readily from the previous discussion:55
1. Establish security: This heading groups recommendations ranging
from the role of the military in doing police work until public
54. To the extent that this claim seems problematic, it is another illustration of the divergence
of interests between occupier and occupied.
55. For some examples of this literature, see WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, HENRY L. STIMSON CTR.,
REBUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN IRAQ: TEN TiPs FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE (2003), available at
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/boneillivagRol.pdf; Marcia Coyle, Towards an Iraqi Legal System,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 2003, at A5; Joseph P. Markoski & Thomas J. Ramsey, Iraq and the Rule of Law,
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION REP., Apr. 24, 2003, at 11, available at http://www.ssd.com/newsletter/-
Communications/062003/IraqRule.pdf.
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:347
security is established on the streets of Iraq, to the need to recruit,
train, and restructure the local police force, to the need to protect
the civilian population from looting, marauding, and vigilante
justice. The missed opportunity to establish security at the
beginning of the post-conflict period has had devastating
consequences for the course of state-building in Iraq. Once it
became apparent to the Iraqi people that law and order had
dissolved and that no one exercised effective control, the
emergence of self-help and self-defense systems-and worse, ones
that privileged communal identities-was the predictable and
dangerous consequence.
56
2. Police and judicial reform: The Iraqi legal profession was largely
defunct under the Baath regime. The judicial system was
subverted, with courts placed under the executive and special
security courts operating concurrently with their own, largely
secret jurisdiction. Lawyers and judges played a role in supporting
the Baath police state, further undermining Iraqi confidence in the
legal system. 57 Rebuilding the judiciary and police reform are
essential steps toward inspiring confidence among Iraqis in a new,
effective, and fair legal system. The combined institutions of law
enforcement will have to be rebuilt, from the police to the prisons
to the courtrooms, and legal professionals to staff these institutions
will have to be recruited and trained. Crucially, such reforms
56. Regional experts and policymakers foresaw these developments and warned of the
potential "primordialization" of Iraq should the public security infrastructure be destroyed and chaos
prevail in the aftermath of a war. See, e.g., Toby Dodge & Steven Simon, Introduction to IRAQ AT THE
CROSSROADS: STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE SHADOW OF REGIME CHANGE 9, 18 (Toby Dodge & Steven
Simon eds., 2003).
57. One U.S. Army JAG reserve officer stationed in Iraq and tasked with the oversight and
restoration of Iraqi courts in southern Iraq described the state of the Iraqi judiciary after thirty-five years
of Baathist rule as follows:
Initial assessments of the Iraqi courts revealed that the courts of general
jurisdiction within each of Iraq's eighteen provinces were widely subject to
political control and influence. The Ministry of Justice in Baghdad had previously
appointed judges based on party loyalty and their willingness to support Baath
party policies through their rulings . . . . Operating under a tight hierarchal
structure, the chief judge in each province was expected to demonstrate
unwavering obedience to Baathist policies and orders from Baghdad .... After
decades of living under such centralized control, the senior members of the Iraqi
bench had become political functionaries who knew that their primary goal was
obeying the regime, with their secondary duty being administering justice to the
Iraqi people. In maintaining a judiciary that was politically obedient, however, the
regime also triggered unanticipated secondary consequences. By placing the
needs of the people in second place, the regime unwittingly planted the seeds for
corruption and bias as the judges placed self-interest above other issues. Over the
past thirty-five years, the Iraqi courts have been characterized by bias and
favoritism, with verdicts being routinely influenced by payoffs and tribal
affiliations. During Coalition interviews with sitting Iraqi judges throughout
southern Iraq in June and July 2003, virtually all judges acknowledged that
widespread corruption characterized their system. The judges also acknowledged
that a litigant's tribal and political connections under the old regime would
frequently be a prime consideration in the outcome of both criminal and civil
trials.
Craig T. Trebilcock, Legal Cultures Clash in Iraq, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 48 (citations omitted).
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require input from Iraqis to secure a measure of local ownership of
the reformed legal system and the resulting institutions.
3. Prison reform: In the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, it
goes without saying that "[h]ow a state treats its prisoners is
compelling evidence of its respect for human rights. '" Correcting
the record of human rights violations that have badly tarnished the
image of the U.S. occupation of Iraq cannot be limited to the
punishment of a few low-ranking servicemen and women. Better
accountability mechanisms, available to ordinary Iraqis, must be
put in place to punish prison abuse. Investing in the necessary
infrastructure for the humane treatment of prisoners in Iraq must
also top the list of priorities for reconstructing the legal system.
4. Modernizing laws: Iraqi civil and criminal codes need revision to
remove instruments of repression. The U.S. State Department
commissioned a group of exiled Iraqi jurists and Arab-American
lawyers to produce a proposal to overhaul the Iraqi legal system in
the run-up to the war in 2002. Known as the "Future of Iraq"
project, this exercise yielded a detailed proposal that was
ultimately discarded by Pentagon planners. Designing a
framework in which Iraqi participation and feedback is solicited
for any legislative or regulatory reform initiative (even when
reforms are undertaken on a transitional basis) is essential to instill
public acceptance of the reform process and to legitimize its
60outcome.
5. Building oversight and accountability mechanisms: For Iraqis to
develop confidence in the police and the courts, oversight
mechanisms to curb corruption, prohibit brutality, and publicly
investigate and punish instances of abuse are essential, both
because of their disciplinary function and because they would
represent a symbol of the transition away from totalitarian legalism
to the rule of law. Any accountability mechanisms must hold the
occupying power and its forces to the same standard applicable to
Iraqis.
6. Transitional justice: Arresting and prosecuting the worst abusers
under the Baath regime is perhaps the one priority that was
58. O'NEILL, supra note 55, at 2.
59. Jonathan S. Landay & Warren P. Strobel, Lack of Planning Contributed to Chaos in Iraq,
KNIGHT-RIDDER, July 12, 2003, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald.6285256.htm. For
critical views on the project since its inception in 2002, see Ctr. for Media and Democracy, Future of
Iraq Project, at http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Future of Iraq (last visited Apr. 20,
2005).
60. A corollary to the modernization of the laws is the need to convene a national
constitutional assembly to draft a new Iraqi constitution. Following Iraq's January 30 election, such an
assembly is the next step in the transition toward a future, sovereign Iraqi state. The principles enshrined
in any constitution drafted by such an assembly cannot be foretold by the course of rule-of-law projects
in the transitional period. The new constitution, if it is to be durable, must be the product of an
indigenous political process-if the result of such a process is a non-federal or non-democratic
constitution, that result will have to be respected internationally as the outcome of a legitimate Iraqi
deliberative process. For more on the tension between the desired outcome from a U.S. perspective and
the likely outcome of a representative Iraqi constitutional process, see supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
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immediately and properly adopted by the occupation authority. But
these prosecutions will do little to promote the rule of law unless
they are widely accepted as legitimate by the Iraqi people. A broad
swathe of Iraqis should have been brought into the process of
choosing the appropriate combination of available instruments for
61transitional justice, including prosecution, before the current
model of the Iraqi Special Tribunal was adopted. With the tribunal
now in flux, there may be an opportunity to revisit the question of
institutional design. 2
While these recommendations are straightforward enough in theory, the
devil is in the details of implementation. Be that as it may, the implementation
of a strategy to establish the rule of law in the aftermath of the invasion was
an obligation the U.S. government undertook when it decided to occupy
Iraq.63 So long as the United States maintains forces under U.S. command in
effective control of Iraq, it remains responsible for internal security, public
order, and establishing the rule of law. The lessons of previous multilateral
peace operations are among the most valuable guidelines for developing a
new strategy to accomplish the first prerequisite of the rule of law-
establishing security. Of the previous peace operations, the one that yields the
most transferable lessons is probably Kosovo. Bernard Kouchner, the senior
U.N. official in Kosovo, has publicly commented that to his mind, the single
most important lesson to be learned from Kosovo... is that peacekeeping missions need
a judicial or a law-and-order "kit" made up of trained police officers, judges and
prosecutors, plus a set of potentially draconian security laws or regulations that are
available upon their arrival. This is the only way to stop criminal behavior from
flourishing in a postwar vacuum of authority.64
That these comments preceded the war in Iraq by over two years is striking.
This emphasis on establishing order and on having a legal "kit" at the ready to
begin establishing the rule of law as early as possible in the post-conflict
context represents a striking affirmation of the centrality of the rule of law to
peace- and state-building.
65
61. Alexander Boraine, the president of the International Center for Transitional Justice,
offered a concise overview of the different available instruments in the arsenal of traditional justice in an
address presented at an Ottawa symposium on transitions to democracy. Alexander Boraine, Transitional
Justice as an Emerging Field, Remarks at a Symposium Entitled Repairing the Past: Reparations and
Transitions to Democracy, at http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10829975041revised-boraine-ottawa-
2004.pdf(Mar. 11, 2004).
62. This issue will be taken up in detail in Section IV, infra.
63. As Senior Judge Gilbert Merritt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted
after his visit to Iraq as part of a judicial training program sponsored by the State Department:
[T]he promise we have made to Iraq [is] of a constitutional democracy, to be held up
as a model in the Middle East ....
... Bremer has completely botched this job. There are, I think, plausible reasons for
our being [in Iraq], but there is no plausible reason, in my view, for doing it the way we
are doing it.
A. Kevin Reinhart & Gilbert S. Merritt, Reconstruction and Constitution-Building in Iraq, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 774, 778 (2004).
64. R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Still Seethes as U.N. Official Nears Exit, WASH. POST, Dec. 18,
2000, at A20.
65. These same lessons were also underscored by Paddy Ashdown, the international
community's High Representative in Bosnia:
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IV. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
The preceding Section considered the centrality of the rule of law in a
transition to a legitimate successor regime in Iraq and surveyed six sets of
measures to foster the rule of law. The first five-establishing security, police
and judicial reform, prison reform, modernizing laws, and building
accountability mechanisms-are essential to the functioning of the ordinary
legal system enforcing the rule of law through legitimate institutions. The
sixth element-that of transitional justice-raises the question of the
relationship between extraordinary justice and the rule of law. As indicated by
the inclusion of transitional justice among the basic prerequisites for
establishing the rule of law, the legitimacy of a new legal system emerging
after a period of lawlessness depends significantly on holding the prior regime
accountable for its abuses. But it is not enough to call for transitional justice
measures to be taken. How the successor regime holds its predecessor
accountable is crucial for the prospects of establishing the rule of law. In
particular, if the successor regime opts to prosecute the prior leadership for
their abuses, it is essential to the success of the transition that such
prosecutions are perceived as legitimate and fair, both domestically and
internationally.
A. Trying Saddam Hussein
With the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003,66 the Bush
administration, the IGC, the international community, and even many ordinary
Iraqis experienced a rare moment of accord: all agreed that Mr. Hussein must
be held accountable for his regime's crimes. The link between accountability
for past crimes and the establishment of a new rule-of-law culture raises the
stakes in deciding who should try Mr. Hussein, where, and against what
standard. As it happened, three days before the capture of Mr. Hussein, the
U.S.-appointed IGC issued the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (the
In Bosnia, we thought that democracy was the highest priority and we measured it by the
number of elections we could organize .... In hindsight, we should have put the
establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning
economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, public
confidence in police and the courts.
Paddy Ashdown, What ILearned in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A25. Similarly, a U.S.
district court judge who visited Iraq in May 2003 published an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal
emphasizing that while progress toward elections would be laudable, the real priority must be the rule of
law:
[I]f Iraq is to become a sovereign state, responsible to the will and needs of its people, the
Coalition and the Governing Council must first establish order through the rule of law.
They must be given the money and manpower to build a working judicial system; there
must be civil and criminal courts, and prosecution and law enforcement must be seen to
be honest, predictable, fair and accessible to all.
Donald Walter, Don't Cut and Run, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2003, at Al 8.
66. Saddam Hussein Arrested in Iraq, BBC.com, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/-
3317429.stm (Dec. 14, 2003); see also Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary,
President Bush Addresses Nation on the Capture of Saddam Hussein, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/-
news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (Dec. 14, 2003).
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Statute), 67 establishing a court to try Iraqis accused of war crimes and crimes
against humanity during the Baathist era. The Statute was consistent with the
public position adopted by the United States that former President Hussein
should be tried before an Iraqi tribunal convened for the specific purpose of
holding the former regime accountable for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed against the Iraqi people. While international human
rights organizations and international lawyers agreed that the Iraqi people
should be afforded an opportunity to hold the Baath regime accountable, there
were serious concerns about holding trials either before a special tribunal
convened by the United States and the occupation authorities, or in the Iraqi
judicial system that had so recently emerged from three decades of Baath70
rule. Iraqis were for their own reasons concerned that a tribunal convened by
the United States would be perceived as illegitimate both within the country
and internationally.71 The significance of the trial of Mr. Hussein is as much a
67. The Statute was enacted directly into law by the IGC through special arrangements ceding
legislative authority temporarily to the Council for the purpose of enacting the Statute under Order No.
48 issued by then-U.S. Chief Administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer. Coalition Provisional Authority,
Order No. 48, Doc. No. CPA/ORD/9 December 2003/48, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/-
20031210 CPAORD_48_ISTandAppendixA.pdf (Feb. 16, 2005). For the text of the Statute, see
Coalition Provisional Authority, The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/humanrights/Statute.htm (Feb. 15, 2005).
68. As of July 2004, twelve high-ranking members of the former Baath regime had appeared
before the Tribunal for preliminary hearings: Saddam Hussein; Abid Hamid Mahmud al-Tikriti (former
presidential secretary); Ali Hassan al-Majid (former presidential adviser); Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan al-
Tikriti (former presidential adviser); Watban Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti (former presidential adviser);
Taha Yassin Ramadan al-Jizrawi (former vice-president); Tariq Aziz (former deputy prime minister);
Sultan Hashim Ahmed (former defense minister); Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi (former member,
Revolutionary Command Council); Aziz Sath a-Numan (former head of the Baath party for western
Baghdad); Kamal Mustafa Abdullah al-Tikriti (former commander of the Republican Guard); and Sabir
Abdul Aziz al-Douri (former mayor of Baghdad). Iraq's Top Detainees, BBC.com, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middleeast/3850567.stm (July 1, 2004). Presumably, mid-level
suspects will be prosecuted by ordinary courts in order to lighten the load on the tribunal and focus its
work on the most egregious crimes committed by the top leadership.
69. The United Nations, in particular, has voiced serious concerns about the Iraqi Special
Tribunal and its competence to meet international legal standards in trying the former Baath regime:
[U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan] raised concerns about the tribunal in general. A
letter from Mr. Annan's office expressed "serious doubts" that the Iraqi Special Tribunal
could meet "relevant international standards." It reiterated his view that the United
Nations should not assist national courts that can order the death penalty and said that the
organization has no legal mandate to assist the tribunal.
Marlise Simons, Iraqis Not Ready for Trials; UN To Withhold Training, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at
All.
70. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Rights Court Run by Iraqis Is Approved by Council, WASH.
POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at Al (noting that the composition of the tribunal, drawn from Iraqi prosecutors,
judges, and lawyers, "has alarmed international human rights organizations, which contend that Iraq's
legal system is too corrupt and inexperienced to handle complex cases"); see also Kenneth Roth, Now,
Try Him in an International Court: Saddam Captured, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 15, 2003, at 10. Roth,
executive director of Human Rights Watch, argues that the fairness of the tribunal before which Saddam
is tried will determine "whether his prosecution advances the rule of law in Iraq or perpetuates a system
of arbitrary revenge." He notes in particular that while a legitimate tribunal would have to include jurists
with an international reputation for integrity, "Saddam's brutal and arbitrary justice system can hardly
be expected to have produced such jurists." Roth concludes that an "internationally led tribunal would
be a far better option." Id. Other international and Iraqi commentators echoed Roth's concerns regarding
the competence and impartiality of the Iraqi judicial system. See, e.g., Chandrasekaran, supra, at A1
("[lInternational experts... noted that the United Nations and the U.S. Justice Department both issued
reports in recent months calling into question the competence and impartiality of Iraq's judicial
system.").
71. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Ridha, Get America Out of the Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at
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matter of the prospects for the rule of law in Iraq as it is a question of
adjudicating the human rights abuses of his regime. Should the trial appear
unfair, and particularly if a flawed trial should end with a death sentence, it
may confirm fears that the U.S. occupation authority and Iraqi administrators
are continuing the long tradition of politicized justice that was the hallmark of
the Baath legal system. Such politicization would gravely undermine the
prospects for the rule of law and democratization in Iraq. Among the most
urgent tasks before the United States and Iraqi transitional authorities, then, is
to ensure that trials holding members of the Baath regime accountable for past
abuses exemplify the legal culture to be established in post-Baath Iraq,
including compliance with international legal standards of justice, due
process, fairness, and transparency.72
B. Designing the Iraqi Special Tribunal
The tribunal was designed by a team of Iraqi lawyers working with
CPA-provided U.S. legal advisers. The international community-including
international lawyers with specific expertise in the workings of the ad hoc
international war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Cambodia, and the hybrid tribunal of Sierra Leone-was pointedly excluded
from the process.73 Fears abound that after decades of repression, the Iraqi
A21 (Iraqi-American lawyer citing concern that U.S. involvement in the Tribunal would detract from the
perceived legitimacy of the proceedings). At a recent training session held in London for Iraqi judges on
the tribunal, the judges themselves cited concerns "that they had little grasp of what one called 'this
whole new body of law"' in reference to the complexities of international law used to deal with mass
killing and genocide. Simons, supra note 69, at A21. Simons goes on to describe conversations with
Iraqi judges who felt
caught between international public opinion and the opinion of Iraqis. They want
experienced judges from other nations to sit on the bench with them but fear that many
Iraqis will see this as humiliating . . . . Several participants said that involving other
countries, and preferably the United Nations, would provide greater legitimacy to the
tribunal. "It would stop the impression that the whole thing is run by the Americans,"
said one prosecutor.
Id.
72. A new Baghdad courthouse located in the heavily guarded Green Zone was completed in
February 2005 as the venue for the prosecutions. In the absence of greater international involvement, the
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of State have been sending legal advisers to the
Iraqi judges appointed to the court to provide them with legal training. Indications have been given that
the first trial will be of Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as "Chemical Ali," followed by the trial of
Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti, a commander of the Republican Guard and director of the Iraqi
intelligence service. Faye Bowers, War-Crimes Trials Gear Up in Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.
23, 2005, at A3; John F. Burns, Trials of Some of Hussein's Aides To Start Within Weeks; His Is
Expected in 2006, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A8.
73. While international jurists were not consulted in the drafting of the Statute, the Statute
does provide for international assistance from lawyers, judges, forensic evidence specialists, and
investigators. Further, under pressure from international human rights organizations, the Statute was
amended to provide for the addition of foreign judges. See Chandrasekaran, supra note 70, at Al ("In a
last-minute concession to the rights groups, [IGC] officials said, the U.S. occupation authority asked
council members to include a provision giving the council the right to appoint international judges if
needed."). Nevertheless, as several commentators have argued, the design of the tribunal did not benefit
from the experience gained by the international community through the prosecutions of war crimes
committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. One significant lesson to be drawn from the
experience of those tribunals-based on the complexity of the trials and the extraordinary burdens on
the jurists undertaking them-is that the Iraqi Special Tribunal will require international lawyers of the
highest caliber and integrity for the trial of Saddam Hussein and his associates to have a semblance of
fairness. On the need for skilled international jurists for the credibility of the tribunal, see Roth, supra
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justice system will not be able to meet the challenge of engaging in complex
war crimes prosecutions on its own. Even with the effective assistance of the
international community, the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia have had to overcome massive technical and
logistical hurdles in coping with enormous dockets and the vast quantities of
evidence and testimony involved in such cases. The expertise developed by
the international community in the conduct of previous tribunals will be sorely
needed as the Iraqi Special Tribunal's work gets underway. Further, the
Tribunal's jurisdiction is not limited to the atrocities committed by the Baath
regime against its own population. In fact, the tribunal will have to hold
Saddam Hussein and his regime accountable for war crimes with a significant
international dimension, including crimes committed during the Iran-Iraq war
and the occupation of Kuwait. As one international human rights expert has
commented, "[t]hese accusations have an international dimension to them that
needs to be addressed in a tribunal that has a strong international flavor."
74
The absence of international consultation or a clear role for international
jurists in the tribunal has led some critics to voice concerns that the United
States was preparing "show trials" for the Baath regime.75
This argument about so-called show trials has three distinct prongs.
First, it is claimed that the United States excluded international jurists from
the process of designing the tribunal because it did not wish to be hampered
by the evidentiary and procedural standards to which international tribunals
must adhere in mounting a case against the former Iraqi regime. By this logic,
satisfied that Saddam Hussein and his coterie were guilty of crimes against
humanity, the United States would afford them a cursory chance to prove their
innocence before having the tribunal pass pre-determined verdicts of guilt.
76
note 70 ("To avoid being perceived as show trials or victor's justice the prosecutions of the former
Ba'ath regime leaders call for highly experienced jurists of unquestioned integrity."). Several human
rights organizations in particular issued sharply worded statements decrying the failure to consult with
the United Nations or international legal experts in drafting the Statute or convening the tribunal. For
instance, in December 2003, Amnesty International issued the following statement: "Amnesty
International has expressed concern to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi
Governing Council about the decision to establish an Iraqi special tribunal that was taken without prior
consultation with the Iraqi civil society or the international community." Press Release, Amnesty Int.,
Iraq: Tribunal Established Without Consultation, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/-
ENGMDE141812003 (Dec. 10, 2003).
74. Human Rights First, Prosecuting Saddam Hussein: A Conversation with Fiona McKay,
Director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights First, at http://www.humanrights-
first.orglintemationaljustice/w contextlw_contI I.htm (Dec. 19, 2003). McKay continues in the same
interview to note:
[A] tribunal that combines Iraqi law and jurists with international law and expertise may
have more legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and the region. It is important that trials of
Saddam Hussein and others don't come to be perceived as revenge trials. The
involvement of international experts will help tend the entire process the legitimacy it
needs to be successful.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Alex Boraine, Justice in Iraq: Let the UN Put Saddam on Trial, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 21, 2004, at 8 (arguing that "[i]f leaders of Saddarn Hussein's regime are prosecuted by, or
on behalf of, the United States, Iraqis will view the prosecutions as 'show trials'); Chandrasekaran,
supra note 70 ("Richard Dicker, director of the international justice program at Human Rights Watch in
New York, said he feared the Iraqi tribunals could 'degenerate into political show trials."); Robert
Collier, "Human Rights Shortcomings" in Hussein Tribunal: Concern Grows that Trial Will Be Seen as
a Kangaroo Court, S. FR. CHRON., Apr. 22, 2004, at Al3. '
76. For instance, Salem Chalabi, the former chief administrator of the tribunal, has publicly
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Second, there was concern that the United States intended to keep a tight leash
on the proceedings in an effort to shield itself and its European allies from
scrutiny for their role in arming the Iraqi regime and enabling its commission
of crimes against the Iraqi people,7 and particularly against the Iranian people
through the use of banned chemical weapons, among others.7s Finally, the
CPA's insistence that the former Baath leadership be tried by an Iraqi tribunal
was viewed by some as an extension of the Bush administration's hostility to
principles of universal jurisdiction and to the use of independent international
courts for the enforcement of humanitarian law.79 The Iraq tribunal would be a
forum for show trials, according to these critics, in the most pejorative sense.80
C. Show Trials: Exemplary or Pejorative?
In contrast to the arguments advanced by critics, there is a second sense
in which prosecutions in the context of transitional justice inevitably
constitute show trials. Trials that exemplify international standards of
accountability for atrocities are for show in the best possible sense: they
provide a public forum for local and international audiences that demonstrates
that justice is being served and leaders are being held accountable for their
crimes. Declaring that the laws of war and human rights standards are
universally applicable sends a powerful message to the domestic population
that suffered under the prior regime-and to other abusive regimes-that
international crimes can and should be punished.
stated concerns that the tribunal may be manipulated to create "[s]how trials followed by speedy
executions" for short-term political gain, which would undermine the development of the rule of law in
Iraq in the long run. John F. Burns & Dexter Filkins, Iraqis Battle Over Control of Panel To Try
Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at Al. Human Rights Watch has noted that the tribunal's statute
lacks several of the basic procedural and substantive safeguards required under international fair trial
standards. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Iraq, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 466, 471 (2005),
available at http://brw.org/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf.
77. As Jennifer Ridha has noted:
(Rlightly or wrongly, the commission of Iraqi war crimes raises the question of American
support for the Hussein regime. Indeed, Jacques Verges, a French lawyer who says he has
been asked to help represent Mr. Hussein, has already promised that the issue will take
center stage before the special tribunal. Mr. Verges has stated that he hopes to nullify Mr.
Hussein's crimes by demonstrating that the United States was complicit in their
commission.
Ridha, supra note 71.
78. On the question of whether evidence of European and U.S. complicity might be brought in
by the defense teams for the Baath leaders prosecuted by the tribunal, see Aaron Glantz, Iraq: The West
May Go On Trial with Saddam, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, http://ipsnews.net/-
interna.asp?idnews=24261 (June 18, 2004) (reporting that some allege that French, German, and U.S.
companies that sold chemical weapons to the Baath regime during the Iran-Iraq war may be implicated
in the evidence presented by Mr. Hussein's defense lawyers). On the question of foreign officials who
might be brought before the tribunal to testify, see Joe Conason, Who Will Testify at Saddam's Trial,
N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 22, 2003, at 5 (noting that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who acted as
President Reagan's special envoy to Iraq in the early 1980s, as well as numerous other U.S. officials,
might be called as witnesses before the tribunal).
79. In this vein, Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch has argued that the creation of the Iraq
tribunal "reflects less a determination to see justice done than a fear of bucking Washington's
ideological jihad against any further enhancement of the international system of justice." Roth, supra
note 70.
80. See supra note 75.
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The pejorative meaning of show trials advanced by the critics of the
Iraqi Special Tribunal is the flip side of the coin. If prosecutions appear to be
conducted by an illegitimate tribunal or a tribunal that does not have
jurisdiction to prosecute all abuses equally and fairly, or if the rules adopted
by the tribunal fall short of international standards of procedural fairness, then
the court will set the wrong kind of example. Regardless of the tribunal before
which Saddam Hussein is tried, his trial and the trials of other members of his
regime will represent instances of exemplary justice that will either establish
or jeopardize several critical aspects of the rule of law in the post-Baath
context. Some of the basic principles that the practice of exemplary justice
through the public trials of former regime leaders should include are:
procedural standards of justice; evidentiary standards for criminal conviction;
the impartiality and competence of Iraqi courts; and the equality of all Iraqi
citizens, including those holding high political office, before the law. To
achieve these objectives, Iraqis must be convinced of the legitimacy of the
tribunal and the regime that has convened it.
In addition to their exemplary function, these prosecutions also serve a
historical purpose. They must afford the Iraqi people an opportunity to
establish a record of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
by the Baath leadership. This process will necessarily be a wrenching one,
considering that the regime committed significant atrocities against its own
people as well as aggression, crimes against humanity, and war crimes against
neighboring countries. Trials of former Baath officials, then, serve multiple
purposes: they symbolize the illegitimacy of the prior regime and its
leadership, initiate a period of transitional justice to advance both exemplary
and ordinary justice, establish a full historical record of the crimes of the
Baath regime, and enforce international humanitarian and human rights norms
as a new foundation for the rule of law in Iraq. How well does the current
conception of the tribunal serve these purposes?
The single greatest concern is that the two meanings of show trials-the
pejorative and the exemplary-will be conflated in a cynical exercise of
victor's justice designed to create the historical record most convenient to the
effective occupation authority in Iraq and its local proxies. Under these
circumstances, the tribunal not only would make a mockery of bringing the
Baath leadership to justice but, more damningly, would undermine the
establishment of the rule of law in post-Baath Iraq. To better understand the
relationship of transitional justice to building the foundations of ordinary
justice through the rule of law, the following Section will first provide a
working definition of transitional justice and will then consider the case of the
proposed prosecutions of the Baath regime before the Iraqi Special Tribunal in
more detail.
D. Defining Transitional Justice
Transitional justice refers specifically to accountability mechanisms
designed to address human rights abuses committed by a regime once that
regime has fallen. For countries undergoing a transition from repression to a
legitimate government, holding the prior regime accountable presents the first
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real test for the establishment of the rule of law. 81 Efforts to rebuild the rule of
law while coming to terms with the lawlessness of a prior regime face
significant challenges. 82 Surveying the full range of transitional justice
instruments available to serve the interests of accountability and transition will
provide the appropriate context against which to judge the choice of
prosecution over other available mechanisms.
Four categories of transitional justice mechanism have been well
developed in the recent practice of states transitioning away from an abusive
past, as well as in the scholarly literature. The one that has been discussed so
far in this Section is the application of criminal sanctions against those held
accountable for the abuses of the prior regime. 83 The principle of nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege (without a law, there is no crime and no
punishment) and the prohibition on ex post facto laws must apply for the
sanctions to constitute acceptable instruments of transitional justice. A second
category of mechanisms in the arsenal of transitional justice is non-criminal
sanctions. Here, those believed to have been responsible for abuses under the
prior regime are subjected to administrative penalties and lustration for their
past activities. De-Baathification, for instance, which involves the purging of
the ranks of the civil service at all levels of individuals directly associated
with the Baath party, is an example of such non-criminal sanctions.8 4 A third
81. See the description of the "kangaroo trial and execution" of former Romanian dictator
Nicolae Ceaucescu in Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES xix, xxi (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995)
[hereinafter TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE].
82. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Roundtable on the Court's Ruling, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
supra note 81, at 653.
83. Ruti Teitel has noted that early conceptions of transitional justice, perhaps under the
influence of the Nuremberg tribunals, viewed punishment as a necessary feature of transitional justice,
to demonstrate that the successor regime represents a clear break from the past and is capable of
imposing punitive sanctions on members of the former regime. Teitel argues that this conception of
transitional justice has given way to another claim, "that successor regimes [are] obligated to investigate
and to repair wrongs perpetrated under prior regimes." Ruti Teitel, From Dictatorship to Democracy:
The Role of Transitional Justice, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 272, 273 (Harold
Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999). She bases this argument on the experience of Latin
American transitions. These regimes underwent internal transition (not regime change through external
military intervention) and relied on amnesties to accomplish non-violent succession. However, she notes
that despite the amnesties, some successor regimes did engage in prosecutions of the leadership of the
prior regime but framed these in terms of "limited" criminal sanctions-prosecutions that yielded
pronouncements of guilt and comprehensive records of abuse rather than extensive or maximal
punishment. The role of the judicial proceedings was to investigate abuses and pronounce verdicts that
individualized accountability in ways that other transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth
commissions, may not have been able to do. In this conception of transitional justice, the formal
recognition of prior wrongdoing through judicial mechanisms is prioritized over retribution, deterrence,
or rehabilitation in the context of extraordinary justice for regime crimes. In transitional contexts where
successor regimes may be vulnerable to destabilizing social cleavages triggered by more extensive
forms of punishment that assign blame in ways that exacerbate intercommunal grievances, one way to
overcome what has come to be known as the "punish-or-pardon" dilemma is to assign responsibility
combined with largely non-criminal sanctions. See Teitel, supra, at 273-78.
84. Ideally, these non-criminal sanctions should apply on the basis of some procedure to
determine whether particular individuals were in fact abusive, active Baath party members. Further, such
procedures should meet basic standards of fairness and impartiality and should be governed by publicly
available rules. None of these requirements was met by the process adopted under the U.S. occupation
for the de-Baathification of the Iraqi state. Rather, the purges associated with de-Baathification were
often perceived as opportunities to settle old scores and were thus delegitimized in the eyes of the Iraqi
public. Worse, the breadth of the de-Baathification process left the Iraqi public sector decimated, leading
to massive unemployment and a reduction in the effectiveness of basic Iraqi institutions.
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mechanism of transitional justice is the creation of an officially sanctioned
historical record of the prior regime's abuses.85 Finally, a fourth method
focuses on creating a national climate of reconciliation for the victims of past
abuses by taking detailed histories of their suffering under the prior regime
and instituting mechanisms to provide victims with compensation and
restitution.
8 6
How do these mechanisms relate to the situation in Iraq? The legitimacy
of Iraqi successor institutions, including the Iraqi Special Tribunal, will
inevitably be linked to the conditions of occupation under which they emerge.
The relationship of the tribunal to an occupation authority that is seen by some
Iraqis as illegal and repressive may undermine the perceived legitimacy of the
prosecutions of Saddam Hussein and the other Baath leaders. Given the
already severe fissures between the Sunni and Shiite communities in Iraq, the
application of severe criminal sanctions-including the imposition of capital
punishment-might trigger political vendettas and other forms of
intercommunal strife between aggrieved Sunni Iraqis and communities
perceived to have encouraged such sanctions. Such politicization would
aggravate the legitimacy deficit faced by the reformed Iraqi judicial system as
it struggles to make good on its new commitment to the rule of law. One way
to alleviate these problems would be to incorporate a wider range of
transitional justice measures into the design of accountability mechanisms for
passing judgment on the Baath regime. With these concerns in mind, the
discussion now turns to a consideration of the tribunal currently convened to
prosecute the Baath leadership.
E. The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Structure and Jurisdiction
A brief description of the structure and substantive jurisdiction of the
tribunal may help to ground the remainder of the discussion. The tribunal is
comprised of five units: tribunal investigative judges; ten trial chambers (each
with a five-judge panel); one appeals chamber (a nine-judge appellate court);
87
a prosecutions department; and an administrative department. While thetribunal does not have a defense department for the benefit of the accused, it
85. Most commonly, such a record is compiled through a painstaking process of collecting
testimonial and physical evidence in national, public hearings--often televised or otherwise dramatically
conveyed to a wide audience of citizens and international observers-frequently in the form of a truth
commission. Perhaps the most famous example of such a mechanism is South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. For an excellent history of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, see ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2001).
86. For a discussion of the use of mechanisms for compensation and restitution in transitions
from a prior repressive regime, see Kritz, supra note 81, at xxviii-xxx. Many examples of the use of
such mechanisms can be drawn from the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe, including in
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, and Slovakia. For a compilation of
the relevant laws of restitution, compensation, and restoration of property in these countries, see 2
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 81, at 643-817. Chile is an example of a country that combined a
commission of inquiry with mechanisms of compensation and restitution. On the Chilean National
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, see id. at 101-69; for the Chilean Law Creating the National
Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, see id. at 685-96.
87. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 67, art. 3.
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does recognize the right to defense. 88 In terms of substantive jurisdiction, the
tribunal will hear four categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and an assortment of specific offenses under Iraqi law,
including misappropriation of funds and invasion of another Arab country.
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With the exception of references to particular Iraqi criminal provisions, the
substantive terms of the Statute have a great deal in common with the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court 90 (ICC) and the various
international agreements on which the Rome Statute is based.91 The tribunal's
jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed between July 17, 1968, and May 1,
2003, the period during which the Baath regime ruled Iraq. Finally, the
tribunal's personal jurisdiction is limited to Iraqi nationals and residents.92
One might criticize the limitations on the tribunal's personal jurisdiction
over non-Iraqi nationals. That the tribunal will not be able to hear evidence
regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by non-Iraqis
against Iraqis during the 1991 Gulf War or the 2003 invasion of Iraq may
undermine its credibility to some extent for ordinary Iraqis. However, while
most Iraqis will likely accept a tribunal that limits its jurisdiction to crimes
committed by the Baath regime, there are other criticisms that may give
observers pause. For instance, the Statute departs from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)93 in two important respects:
the Statute provides no guarantee against double jeopardy94 and it permits the
imposition of the death penalty. 95 The ICCPR is generally considered to set
forth the minimum standard required under international law for the protection
of the rights of the accused. The Iraqi Statute falls far short, for instance, of
the more robust protections provided by the Rome Statute.96 The Director of
88. Id. art. 20(d)(2).
89. Id. arts. 10, 14.
90. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
91. The Rome Statute recognizes four categories of crime. The first three are consistent with
the three international categories recognized by the Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute. The fourth category is
that of the crime of aggression. See id. art. 5(1). It is interesting that this category was omitted from the
Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute in light of its potential applicability to crimes committed by the Baath
regime against both Iran and Kuwait. The apparent desire of the drafters of the Statute to limit
accountability to crimes committed in the course of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait is
demonstrated by the content of the fourth category of crime recognized under the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Statute, which encompasses a crime that may be paraphrased as the use of armed force against an Arab
country. See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 67, arts. 11-14.
92. Id. arts. l(b), 10.
93. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
94. In Articles 25 and 26 (governing review and appeals proceedings), the Statute specifies
that acquittals in the trial chambers may be reversed by the appeals chamber and that the accused may be
re-tried for an offense if a new fact comes to light and the appeals chamber deems it appropriate. Statute
of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 67, arts. 25-26.
95. Amnesty International noted in a December 2003 statement that it is "a great
disappointment to see representatives of the Occupying Powers now supporting or professing neutrality
on the issue of the death penalty in Iraq rather than encouraging the permanent end of this obsolete and
inhuman punishment." Collier, supra note 75.
96. Rights afforded under the Rome Statute but excluded from the provisions of Article 20
(Rights of the Accused) of the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal include the right to be free from
coercion, duress, torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention; the right to see evidence in the prosecutor's
possession; a requirement that the court be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and a
prohibition on trials in absentia. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 90, arts. 55(l)(b), (d), 67(2), 66(3),
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the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch, Richard Dicker,
has complained that the Statute has "glaring human rights shortcomings" as a
result of the inadequate protections afforded to defendants.
97
Other criticisms of the tribunal have focused on the context in which it
was convened and particularly the U.S. role in its design. For instance, one
commentator has argued that the Iraqi interim government "should reconsider
provisions of the tribunal law that seemingly emphasize some actions by Mr.
Hussein, like the invasion of Kuwait, that were met with U.S. reprisal, more
than those that benefited from the support of the United States, like the war
with Iran." 98 Arguments have also been advanced to accord a greater role to
international jurists and prosecutors in the proceedings while minimizing the
role of U.S. advisers. These recommendations would bring the tribunal in
closer keeping with the model of a hybrid international-local tribunal best
exemplified by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.99 Under such a model, the
tribunal would allow Iraqi judges and prosecutors to work side by side with
leading international judges and lawyers with expertise and experience drawn
from previous war crimes prosecutions, support that Iraqi jurists have already
requested. 100
Finally, the tribunal came under heightened scrutiny in the fall of 2004
as political struggles over its control among Iraqi officials became public.
Salem Chalabi, a U.S.-trained lawyer who enjoyed close ties with the U.S.
authorities in Iraq during the CPA's tenure, was originally appointed as the
executive director of the tribunal by the Iraqi National Congress in April
2004.101 He was subsequently removed from that position by the Iraqi Interim
Government after charges were filed against Mr. Chalabi in an Iraqi court on
an unrelated matter. 102 Mr. Chalabi was replaced by Amer Bakri, a member of
Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's political party, the Iraqi National
Accord. 103 While the initial appointment of Mr. Chalabi had been
controversial as a result of his family ties and his connections to the U.S.
occupation authority, his replacement has generated even greater anxiety
about the tribunal's politicization. Indeed, Mr. Chalabi himself has publicly
commented that he believes the Interim Iraqi Government replaced him in
63, with Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 67, art. 20.
97. His principal complaint concerns the possibility that confessions obtained through
coercion might be admissible as evidence before the tribunal. Dicker also notes that "fiun a fair trial, the
accused's rights must be respected .... The first group of accused, including Saddam Hussein, had no
access to defense lawyers when they were interrogated nor when they were brought to court on July 1."
Simons, supra note 69.
98. Ridha, supra note 71.
99. For information on the proceedings before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see The
Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.sc-sl.org.
100. Simons, supra note 69 (quoting Iraqi judges concerned that they will need greater support
from international jurists to ensure the legitimacy of the tribunal).
101. Tribunal Set Up for Saddam Trial, BBC.com, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle.east/-
3644431 .stm (Apr. 21, 2004) (noting that the Iraqi National Congress had appointed Salem Chalabi, the
nephew of its then-head Ahmed Chalabi, as general director of the tribunal).
102. Iraq PM "Seeks Saddam Show Trial", BBC.com, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/lfhi/world/-
middle east13684052.stm (Sept. 23, 2004) (noting that murder charges had been filed against Mr.
Chalab, and that he believed his replacement as director of the tribunal was politically motivated).
103. Bums & Filkins, supra note 76.
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order to engage in "show trials followed by speedy executions."' 1 4 These
public, political struggles over the composition of personnel controlling the
tribunal's proceedings have done serious damage to the perceived integrity,
impartiality, and legitimacy of the tribunal. Worse, the public accusation that
the tribunal will ultimately engage in show trials, particularly when issued by
one of the drafters of its Statute, may persuade Iraqis that the shadow of
political justice still falls over Iraq's legal system before the tribunal even
hears its first case.
The appearance that the tribunal will engage in show trials in the
pejorative sense-whether as a result of its composition, the limitation on
rights afforded to defendants, or its association with the U.S. occupation 1 5-
carries serious dangers for the establishment of the rule of law in Iraq. These
criticisms of the tribunal should be addressed immediately to salvage its
reputation and the integrity of its prosecutions. With respect to the
composition of the tribunal, it is important for the Interim Iraqi Government
or its successor to take immediate measures to assure Iraqi and international
observers that the staffing of the tribunal is free of political considerations,
particularly through the inclusion of international judges with a reputation for
impartiality. 106 The deficiencies in the Statute might also be remedied by
amendment, particularly with the input of international lawyers who have
developed expertise in the basic international standards to protect the rights of
the accused. There are also lessons to be learned from how these protections
have been operationalized in a wide variety of contexts including, most
recently, in the design of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.10 7 It is the last of
the potential criticisms that is the most vexing and difficult to address. The
question of whether a tribunal perceived by Iraqis as having been convened
under the authority of an occupying army can escape the appearance of
104. Iraq PM "Seeks Saddam Show Trial", supra note 102.
105. Nor does it help that the United States has been engaging in what much of the world
perceives as show trials of its own at its military base in Guanthnamo, Cuba. The military commissions
that provide cursory review of the basis for the indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens held at a
detention facility at the Guanthnamo military base have generated widespread criticism among U.S. and
international jurists. See, e.g., "Bin Laden Driver" Hearing Halted, BBC.com, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/-
2/hi/americas/3994183.stm (Nov. 9, 2004) (citing a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia to halt the proceedings of a military commission at Guantfnamo until a determination could
be made as to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the accused); Nick Childs, Guantanamo
Controversy Rumbles On, BBC.com, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/-americas/3754238.stm (Oct.
18, 2004) (noting that the United States has finally established some form of cursory review for those
indefinitely detained at Guantfnamo).
106. Alex Boraine is a prominent proponent of this reasoning, arguing that "[i]fjustice is to be
done and the full truth is to be told, then the ownership and design of these processes must be left to
legitimate representatives of the Iraqi people, acting with the full support and assistance of the United
Nations." Boraine, supra note 75.
107. Many scholars have argued that the hybrid model of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is
the most appropriate model for the Iraqi tribunal. For instance, Alex Boraine notes that "[bly drawing on
both national and international staff, the 'hybrid' tribunals have sought to blend international expertise
and impartiality with local ownership and legitimacy." Id. The appeal of combining local ownership
with international impartiality is especially strong in the Iraqi context, particularly in light of the
controversies that have surrounded the composition of the Iraqi Special Tribunal to date. But see
Interview by Tony Jones with Geoffrey Robertson, US Needs to Rethink Hussein Trial: Robertson,
AUSTL. BROADCASTING CORP., http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/sl245842.htm. (Nov. 17,
2004) (suggesting that conditions in Iraq are so poor that the tribunal should be moved outside the
country).
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victor's justice is an extremely important one. The final Section of this paper
will consider this question in the broader context of the special challenges
faced by an occupying power interested in instilling the rule of law in an
occupied territory.
V. TRUSTEESHIP AND THE SPECIAL CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION THROUGH
EXTERNAL INTERVENTION
A general theme running through this paper has been that nation-
building is rendered particularly precarious when undertaken through
occupation. State-building exercises in which the international community
provides support to a successor regime, rather than engaging in unilateral or
multilateral administration of an occupied territory, are, for all their
challenges, more straightforward than the enterprise on which the U.S.
government has embarked in Iraq. In considering the particular challenges of
justice under occupation, this Section will set forth three basic points
regarding the tension between occupation and the prerequisites for
establishing the rule of law. It will then briefly analyze recent arguments in
defense of a conception of political trusteeship in Iraq. It will conclude by
proposing some modest ambitions for securing the conditions for the rule of
law in Iraq going forward.
Three aspects of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq pose a real dilemma for
the establishment of the rule of law. First, the invasion and occupation of Iraq
are widely seen as illegal under international law. With the United States
perceived as having trampled the rule of law at the international level to
accomplish its regime-change objectives in Iraq, subsequent U.S. claims to be
advancing the cause of rule-of-law promotion by establishing the foundations
for a new legal system in Iraq ring hollow to many Iraqi and international
observers. Second, during the course of the occupation, the United States has
consistently ignored the international law of belligerent occupation, set forth
in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.1"8 For
instance, it was noted above that the international law framework for
belligerent occupation requires an occupying power to retain the status quo
with respect to the legal and political system of the occupied territory, except
where modifications are strictly necessary for reasons of security. 109 Since one
of the declared objectives of the U.S. occupation of Iraq was regime change,
the CPA and the Bush administration made it clear from the outset that these
requirements would not be observed and that an interim constitution would be
put in place, designed precisely to transform the Iraqi legal and political
system.' But these alterations to the underlying Iraqi legal system were
undertaken without the consent of the Iraqi people, a democratic mandate, or
the international legitimacy that would have been associated with a U.N.
108. See supra note 9.
109. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
110. The interim Iraqi constitution was adopted by the CPA on March 8, 2004, and was
intended to be a foundational step toward building a new culture of constitutionalism in Iraq. Coalition
Provisional Authority, Law of Administration for the State of Iraq, http://www.cpa-iraq.org/-
government/TAL.html (Mar. 8, 2004).
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framework for the conduct of the civilian administration of Iraq. There is a
fundamental tension underlying U.S. arguments for building the rule of law in
the Iraqi domestic legal system, even as the conduct of the occupation has
undermined fundamental features of the international rule of law concerning
occupation.
While these first two problems are serious, the third dilemma is perhaps
the most damaging to the prospects of rule-of-law promotion through
occupation. U.S. efforts to afford impunity to U.S. military and civilian
personnel in Iraq directly undermine basic principles of the rule of law. By
placing themselves above the law, the U.S. occupation authorities do a
tremendous disservice to the cause of justice in Iraq. This form of impunity is
in tension with both the robust conception of the rule of law advanced by U.S.
nation-builders and the international law of occupation to which such
authorities are subject.'11
One way in which authoritarian regimes distinguish themselves is
through their propensity to place their leadership above the law. Such a
system of impunity enables the entrenchment of the authoritarian regime
while civic life, constitutional commitments, and political life atrophy. This
was the method by which the Baath regime governed Iraq for thirty-five years.
The pattern is in danger of repeating itself so long as Iraqis are daily conveyed
the message that there is no mechanism through which they may pursue
judicial redress for harms they suffer at the hands of the occupation
administration and its army, and that U.S. citizens operating in Iraq enjoy
near-total impunity.
There are both subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which this message is
communicated. In the early days of the occupation, President Bush issued an
executive order that prohibited all judicial process with respect to Iraqi oil
reserves and production, 112 which may arguably preempt the application of the
Alien Tort Claims Act to actions by CPA officials or U.S. contractors
operating in Iraq. 113 While this order may not be familiar to most Iraqis, a less
subtle message was delivered during the course of the revelations of the
abuses that took place at the Abu Ghraib prison. Indeed, one might argue that
the Abu Ghraib scandal, and its handling by the occupation authorities, the
U.S. Department of Defense, and the Bush administration, sounded the death
knell for the legitimacy of the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq and its claims
111. On the robust conception of rule of law, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. On the
international law of occupation applicable to U.S. officials in Iraq, see supra notes 11, 24-28 and
accompanying text.
112. Exec. Order No. 13303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31, 931 (May 28, 2003). In a relevant passage, the
order declares that "any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial
process is prohibited, and shall be deemed null and void, with respect to the following: (a) the
Development Fund for Iraq, and (b) all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products." Id.
113. See, e.g., Lisa Girion, Immunity for Iraqi Oil Dealings Raises Alarm, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
10, 2003, at Al (quoting Tom DeVine, legal director of the Washington-based Government
Accountability Project, who notes that "as written, the executive order appears to cancel the rule of law
for the oil industry or anyone else who gets possession or control of Iraqi oil or anything of value related
to Iraqi oil"); Anthony J. Sebok & Claire R. Kelly, Does a Presidential Iraq Executive Order Take Away
Tort Victims' Right to Sue?, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/-
commentary/20031103_kelly.html (Nov. 3, 2003) (arguing that the order "may also prohibit a plaintiff
from bringing a tort claim... arising from Iraqi oil production" and that it may have been prompted by
recent Alien Tort Claims Acts suits in U.S. courts).
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regarding the rule of law. 114 While there is no need to review the sordid details
of the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib, it is worth noting that the procedures
for the incommunicado and secret detention of Iraqis at various detention
facilities on U.S. military bases had already given rise to a perception among
ordinary Iraqis that those who were detained by U.S. authorities were
effectively disappeared well before the revelations concerning Abu Ghraib.
Stories of relatives going from one U.S. military base to another in search of
detained loved ones are commonplace.' 15 The photographs from Abu Ghraib
only completed the picture of the daily conditions of detention for the largely
civilian detainee population held at military bases without access to lawyers or
family visits. In the words of one Iraqi judge, far from strengthening the new
Iraqi judicial system, "when coalition forces detain people in coalition-run
prisons like Abu Ghrayb, family members often are unable to find out where
they are kept. The families turn to the Iraqi judiciary but local authorities have
no more information than they do .... [T]his situation has made judges even
more vulnerable.""
1 6
In addition, Iraqis take for granted that neither civilian U.S. occupation
officials nor U.S. military personnel are liable to be brought before the Iraqi
judiciary to answer for their abuses. Property confiscation and destruction,
home demolition, arbitrary detentions, abuses during security sweeps or while
in detention, and the arbitrary killing of civilians, either in detention or in
routine encounters with coalition forces, all lie beyond the jurisdiction of Iraqi
courts.1 17 The fact that the Iraqi civilian population is subject to these abuses
114. The abuses at Abu Ghraib have been documented in exhaustive detail. For an excellent
compilation of analysis and essays on the abuses as well as official documents and photographs detailing
the extent of the abuses and the Bush administration's evolving legal position on the use of torture, see
MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004). For
additional compilations of official documents, reports from official investigations, and published
analyses, see THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL
AND PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE IN IRAQ (Steven Strasser ed., 2004); THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). For a detailed
analysis of the policies that led to the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, see SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF
COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB (2004).
115. See, e.g., Hannah Allam, Dozens of Missing Iraqis Believed To Be Lost in Abu Ghraib
Prison, KNIGHT-RIDDER, June 10, 2004, available at http://www.realcities.commld/-
krwashingtoI8891610.htm (noting that "[w]ith no clearinghouse for missing-person reports and
technical errors in the intake process, families ... can do little but wait outside the tall prison gates in
hopes that someone recognizes the missing men pictured on their flimsy, photocopied fliers"); Ian
Fisher, Searing Uncertainty for Iraqis Missing Loved Ones, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at Al (noting that
a "Red Cross [report] directed to the American-led occupation authorities [stated] that the system for
notifying families of prisoners effectively did not exist"); Dan Murphy, At Prison Gate, Iraqi Families
Vent, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 2004, at 6, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/-
0326/pO6sOl-woiq.html (describing a convoy of Iraqi prisoners taken away from Abu Ghraib in buses to
an unknown destination as their families watched and wept); Alex Rodriguez, U.S. Holding Iraqis at
Notorious Prison; Families Barred and Very Few Inmates Have Been Allowed To See Lawyers, CHIC.
TRIB., Aug. 6, 2003, at 4 (noting that Said Boumedouha of Amnesty International had said that "the U.S.
also has not devised a way for Iraqi families to learn where relatives are in custody").
116. Charles Recknagel, Iraq: Judges Say Improving Rule of Law Depends on Security, RADIO
FREE EUROPE, at http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/c727eb9l-42a7-4039-b4ea-
d26500b15f05.html (Sept. 15, 2004) (citing Judge Noman Fathy Hassan of the Iraqi Court of Cassation
in Baghdad).
117. The Washington Post reported just before the dissolution of the CPA and the transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government that
[t]he Bush administration has decided to take the unusual step of bestowing on its own
troops and personnel immunity from prosecution by Iraqi courts for killing Iraqis or
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without any domestic forum for redress echoes the experience of Iraqis under
the prior regime. When placed in the broader context of U.S. efforts to shield
U.S. forces and personnel from ICC jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction, and
any other international accountability mechanism for war crimes, these
practices are that much more damning." 8 Under the Bush administration,
international law may sometimes be a useful tool, but it rarely, if ever,
represents a constraint on U.S. actions. The contempt shown by the U.S.
government for the rule of law at the international level has undermined the
international legitimacy of the occupation and may well color Iraqi
perceptions of U.S. arguments in favor of the domestic rule of law for Iraq.
Furthermore, the accusations of victor's justice in the trials of Saddam
Hussein and other members of his regime are exacerbated by the appearance
that the United States has placed itself above the law in Iraq.
What, then, is the remaining best-case scenario for advancing the rule of
law in Iraq? Several recent commentators have proposed that the U.S.
occupation of Iraq be understood as a sort of political trusteeship." 9 This idea
of political trusteeship suggests that the intervention in Iraq is designed to
prepare the Iraqi people for self-governance. There are numerous objections
that may be advanced against such a conception, not least the facts on the
ground in Iraq. Two criticisms that have received particular attention are those
of paternalism and the difficulty presented by the self-interested pursuit of an
occupation strategy by an occupying power when the interests of the occupier
and the occupied diverge. Versions of both of these criticisms have been
elaborated in the foregoing discussion. 120 Noah Feldman has offered responses
to these criticisms, which run roughly as follows. 12' First, while the problem
of paternalism is a serious one, it may be attenuated or overcome by rendering
destroying local property after the occupation ends and political power is transferred to
an interim Iraqi government, U.S. officials said. The administration plans to accomplish
that step--which would bypass the most contentious remaining issue before the transfer
of power-by extending an order that has been in place during the year-long occupation
of Iraq. Order 17 gives all foreign personnel in the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional
Authority immunity from "local criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction and from
any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their parent
states.
Robin Wright, US. Immunity in Iraq Will Go Beyond June 30, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at Al. In an
unprecedented subsequent decision, the Bush administration extended this immunity to U.S. civilian
contractors working in Iraq. Ellen McCarthy, Immunity Provision Extended for US. Firms with
Reconstruction Contracts, WASH. POST, June 29, 2004, at A18. Indeed, Iraqi judicial authorities'
jurisdiction over Iraqis was also called into question under the Interim Iraqi Government. See, e.g., Lisa
Ashkenaz Croke, Washington Refuses To Relinquish Legal Authority to "Sovereign" Iraq, NEW
STANDARD, July 7, 2004, at http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=showitem&itemid=645
(noting that the question of whether the Iraqi Interim Government or U.S. officials had jurisdiction over
detainees remained unsettled after the "transfer" of sovereignty).
118. On U.S. efforts to undermine the authority of the ICC and to conclude bilateral immunity
agreements to shield U.S. personnel from the jurisdiction of the ICC or other forums in which they
might be held accountable for war crimes or crimes of occupation, see Justice Richard J. Goldstone, US
Withdrawal from ICC Undermines Decades of American Leadership in International Justice, 21 INT'L
CRIM. CT. MONITOR 3 (2001), available at http://www.iccnow.org/publications/monitor/-
21/monitor2l.200106.english.pdf; Amnesty Int., US Threats to the International Criminal Court, at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/icc-US-threats-eng (July 2004).
119. See FELDMAN, supra note 15; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for
Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385 (2003).
120. See supra Section II.B.
121. FELDMAN, supra note 15, at 52-91.
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the occupying authority accountable to the occupied population in the design
undertaken for nation-building. In response to the second criticism, Feldman
argues that the self-interested pursuit of an occupation strategy may be
beneficial to both the occupying authority and the population living under
occupation where their interests converge. Based on these insights, he
provides an account of a best-case scenario in Iraq.
The accountability mechanisms Feldman suggests to overcome the first
objection center on free speech, freedom of assembly, and participation. So
long as the occupation authority permits the local population to express freely
their views concerning the nation-building process, allows them to meet and
express collectively their views to the occupation authority, and selects some
members of the local population to act as representatives that provide input
into the process, there is a sufficient degree of accountability to address the
problem of paternalism. With respect to the problem of self-interest, Feldman
suggests that the interest being pursued by the U.S. government in Iraq be
understood as the national security interest in ensuring that Iraq does not
become a breeding ground for terror. Conceived in this way, the convergence
of our interests with those of the Iraqi population is clear. The argument about
interest convergence is then elaborated in terms of a power negotiation
between the occupation authority and the principal Iraqi leaders who
command domestic legitimacy. 12" There is one additional gloss on this
argument: the problem of interest divergence between occupier and occupied
is no greater, according to Feldman, in the case of a unilateral occupation than
in the case of a multilateral or U.N.-mandated occupation. 123
As I have argued in this paper, neither the mechanisms for holding the
U.S. occupation authority accountable for its conduct to the Iraqi people nor
the incentive structures for interest convergence underlying the occupation are
sufficiently robust to justify the continuation of the U.S. project in Iraq in its
present form. The basic insight of the paternalism objection is that there is no
basis to believe that an external intervener will be better able to perceive the
long-term interests of the occupied territory's population than that
population's own representatives. A response that turns on providing
accountability mechanisms in lieu of the consent of the governed would need
to provide a significant degree of accountability. Direct accountability
mechanisms, such as an international or hybrid court before which Iraqis
could seek redress against U.S. administrators and military forces for the
abuses committed during the occupation, do not exist and are extremely
unlikely to emerge. Accordingly, and particularly following the revelations of
systematic abuses committed in Iraq, mechanisms for holding the occupying
power accountable will be insufficient unless they provide government by
consent and the subjection of rulers-be they Iraqi or U.S.124-to the laws
122. It is worth noting that the local leaders with whom the occupation authority engages in
power-brokering here are not the same as the representatives appointed to address the first problem of
paternalism. Thus in the examples Feldman provides, it is not negotiations with the Governing Council
but rather with indigenous leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who derive their legitimacy
from popular support, that address the problem of self-interest. Id. at 67, 89.
123. Id. at 90.
124. For these purposes, no significant transition occurred when the baton was passed from the
CPA to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. So long as a large U.S. military force continues to patrol the
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applicable in Iraq. As for the argument of interest convergence, the discussion
of the transformation of Iraqi commercial laws and the issuance of executive
orders to immunize U.S. citizens from judicial process for their activities
related to the Iraqi oil industry should suffice to suggest that a divergence of
interests exists between U.S. civilian administrators, military personnel,
contractors, and corporations, on the one hand, and ordinary Iraqis on the
other. Assessing the legitimacy of the continuing U.S. presence in Iraq
requires consideration of this divergence of interests.
Would an international trustee face the same legitimacy deficit based on
self-interest as any individual state trustee? I would argue that it would not
confront the same degree of delegitimization for three reasons. First, an
international organization's self-interest is not bound up with the commercial,
territorial, or geopolitical strategic objectives of a state actor. It would be
naive to claim that international organizations are not hostage, in many
respects, to the underlying state interests of their members. Nevertheless, we
might also concede that the only state in the international system powerful
enough to completely harness the United Nations to the furtherance of its
unilateral interests is the United States. After a year and a half of direct U.S.
occupation, most Iraqis might be willing to take their chances with indirect
U.S. occupation mediated through the United Nations, which would at least
involve an international civil service with state-building experience and a
civilian police force as part of the package. Second, although the United
Nations does face some legitimacy challenges in Iraq as a result of its role in
enforcing the twelve-year-long sanctions regime, its reputation has not been
tarnished by the occupation nearly to the extent that the U.S. presence in Iraq
has. Finally, international organizations are less able to shield their personnel
from accountability for abuses committed in an administered territory. In
short, restoring the rule of law in Iraq and promoting transitional justice will
be better served by internationalizing support for Iraqi-led state-building while
transitioning away from occupation.
Unsurprisingly, I am not alone in coming to this conclusion with respect
to the best-case scenario for Iraq. It is perhaps appropriate that I conclude
these reflections by quoting from a strategy research report prepared for the
Army War College in March 2004:
History teaches that processes of transitional justice succeed when they acquire
legitimacy among the affected population and in the eyes of the world community. Such
legitimacy can best be achieved when Iraqi-owned processes are supported by
international actors. The United Nations and other international organizations have
substantial expertise from experience gained in other post-conflict settings. Coalition and
interim Iraqi officials should draw heavily on this expertise and experience to help ensure
success in reestablishing the rule of law and in winning the peace in Iraq.
1 25
To be legitimate, durable, and effective, Iraq's new institutions and the
foundations for the rule of law will have to be established by Iraq's legitimate
representatives with the support and assistance of the international
streets of Iraq under U.S. command, the United States should be recognized as the de facto ruler of Iraq.
125. RICHARD 0. HATCH, RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-WAR IRAQ: STEPS, MISSTEPS
AND A CALL TO MAXIMIZE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR IRAQI-LED PROCESSES iii (2004).
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community. Continuing the current strategy of indefinite de facto occupation
will yield disappointment for America's would-be nation-builders and a
catastrophe for Iraq.
